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FOREWORD
This Letort Paper provides a detailed chronology
and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes
of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The author, Mr. Kenneth
Absher, contends that, when our national security is at
stake, the United States should not hesitate to undertake
risky intelligence collection operations, including
espionage, to penetrate our adversary’s deceptions. At
the same time, the United States must also understand
that our adversary may not believe the gravity of our
policy warnings or may not allow its own agenda to be
influenced by U.S. diplomatic pressure.
As both a student of and key participant in the
events of the crisis, the author is able to provide in-depth
analysis of the failures and successes of the national
intelligence community and executive leadership
during the buildup to the confrontation, and the
risky but successful actions which led to its peaceful
settlement. From his analysis, the author suggests
considerations relevant to the collection, analysis, and
use of intelligence which have continuing application.

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This Letort Paper provides a detailed chronology
and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of
the Cuban Missile Crisis, and suggests the applicability
of lessons learned to the collection, analysis, and
use of intelligence in strategic decisionmaking. The
author was assigned to Sherman Kent’s Office of
National Estimates (ONE) after completing his Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Junior Officer Training
Program in June 1962. He was one of two analysts for
Latin America in Kent’s ONE. He was a participant in
the drafting of every National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) and Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE)
on Cuba and the Soviet military build-up from June
1962 to February 1963. This paper describes how the
crisis unfolded using the author’s personal recollection,
declassified documents, and many memoirs written by
senior CIA officers and others who were participants.
Lessons learned include the need to avoid having
our political, analytical and intelligence collection
mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately
analyzing intelligence about our adversaries true plans
and intentions. When our national security is at stake,
we should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence
collection operations including espionage, to penetrate
our adversary’s deceptions. We must also understand
that our adversaries may not believe the gravity of
our policy warnings or allow their own agendas to be
influenced by diplomatic pressure. When Soviet leader
Nikita Khrushchev decided secretly to place offensive
missiles in Cuba, he clearly did not believe President
John Kennedy would use military action to enforce
U.S. policy warnings against such a deployment.
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Lacking hard intelligence to the contrary, the
American Intelligence Community (IC) also issued a
failed SNIE on September 19, 1962, stating Khrushchev
would not place offensive missiles in Cuba. The Soviets
had never before placed such missiles outside the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Warsaw
Pact and the IC believed that Khrushchev certainly
would not run the risk of a U.S. military response to such
a provocation. Thanks to the leadership of the Director
of Central Intelligence and the President, the United
States overcame a political mind-set against scheduling
U-2 flights directly over Cuba where they risked being
shot down by Soviet surface-to-air missiles. Intelligence
from an espionage agent was used by the historic U-2
flight to photograph the SS-4 medium range missiles
being installed in western Cuba. An analysis of this and
subsequent U-2 photography utilizing the operational
manuals of the Soviet offensive missiles provided
clandestinely enabled the IC to tell the President how
much time he had prior to each missile site becoming
operational. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev finally
agreed to withdraw the missiles, bombers, and nuclear
weapons after being convinced that the United States
was preparing to launch a massive bombing and
invasion of Cuba. The author concluded that such
U.S. military operations were within 48-72 hours of
being launched when Khrushchev publicly said the
missiles would be withdrawn. There was a last minute
understanding that Jupiter missiles would probably
be withdrawn later from Turkey if Soviet missiles
were first withdrawn from Cuba. But imminent U.S.
military action was what convinced Khrushchev that
the missiles had to be withdrawn.

x

MIND-SETS AND MISSILES:
A FIRST HAND ACCOUNT OF THE CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS
INTRODUCTION—FAILED MIND-SETS
Policy and intelligence failures laid the groundwork
for the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the most dangerous
crisis of the Cold War. This monograph will discuss
and analyze the different mind-sets, or fixed mental
attitudes, which policymakers and other officials
brought to the task of analyzing intelligence and
making foreign policy decisions. Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev’s secret policy decision to place SS-4
medium and SS-5 intermediate range missiles in Cuba
was based on an erroneous assessment that once the
missiles had secretly been emplaced, President John
F. Kennedy would accept them as a fait accompli.
Kennedy’s perceived lack of confidence during the
failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April 1961, was
one reason Khrushchev thought he could get away with
placing the offensive missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev
also had an ideological mind-set that believed history
was on the side of socialism and communism, and that
capitalism and constitutional democracy were weak
and would ultimately be defeated by communism
and the Soviet Union. In Khrushchev’s mind-set, the
extra-human forces of “history” were major drivers
of political, economic, and foreign policy decisions,
and he demonstrated that he was prepared to be an
obedient agent of these forces, regardless of the risk of
war and bloodshed. As an agent of forces that promote
violent change, he nonetheless realized the utility of
engaging in diplomacy as a means of possibly buying
time to prepare for violent change, and even to acquire
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allies in his efforts to have outside forces achieve their
objectives.
For its part, the American Intelligence Community
(IC) had a status quo mind-set that concluded
Khrushchev would not place such missiles in Cuba
because the Soviets had never before placed such
offensive missiles outside the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) and the Warsaw Pact. American
Intelligence also thought that Khrushchev would not
risk provoking the strong U.S. reaction which would
certainly be generated by placing such missiles (with
their nuclear warheads) in Cuba. Khrushchev, however,
did not see it the way we thought he would, or the
way we thought he should. Kennedy was unsuccessful
in the 16-month aftermath of the failed June 1961
Vienna Summit in efforts to disabuse Khrushchev
of his erroneous mind-sets about the weakness of
Kennedy and the superiority of history and communist
ideology.
President Kennedy activated U.S. military reserves
and issued strongly worded warnings to Khrushchev
emphasizing U.S. military and nuclear superiority
over the USSR. But Khrushchev remained convinced
that Kennedy was weak, and the United States, as a
capitalist state, was doomed by history to be defeated
by socialism and ultimately by communism. Only when
confronted by the growing certainty of a U.S. bombing
and invasion of Cuba, and the predictable obliteration
of life in the Soviet Union by U.S. missiles and bombers
should he choose general nuclear war, did Khrushchev
step back from the precipice.
There was also a mind-set of American intelligence
and policy officials that favored intelligence from
technical sources, while downgrading information from
human sources such as clandestine espionage agents
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and refugee debriefings. This mind-set was formed in
part by the larger volume and greater familiarity with
intelligence collected from overt technical platforms
such as vehicles, ships, aircraft, and satellites. One
example of this mind-set was the U.S. Air Force’s use
of inflated assessments of Soviet nuclear and missile
strength to defend its budget. When these erroneous
assessments were contradicted by intelligence from a
highly valuable and reliable espionage agent, Colonel
Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet Military Intelligence officer
jointly run by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
and British intelligence (MI-6), this information
was not given the credibility it deserved until it was
subsequently confirmed by our first generation Corona
satellite reconnaissance.
There was also a U.S. policy mind-set that caused
a delay in authorizing critical U-2 flights over the
interior of Cuba. This mind-set was fearful of the
political and diplomatic consequences of Soviet
surface to air missiles shooting down a U-2 on the
eve of the 1962 U.S. mid-term elections. This mindset was finally overcome at the insistence of Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) John McCone who, as
leader of the IC, obtained the President’s approval to
resume such flights in time to discover the missiles
before they had become operational. Using earlier
Corona photography of missiles inside the USSR and
the top secret operating manuals of the SS-4 and SS-5
missiles which had been clandestinely photographed
by Penkovsky and provided to the CIA and MI-6,
photographic interpreters were able to identify the
missiles being installed and determine when each
missile site would become operational. The President
thus knew how much time he had to formulate and
implement a policy to convince Khrushchev to remove
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the missiles before having to take direct military
action.
There was also a U.S. policy mind-set which
sought revenge for the April 1961 defeat of the Bay
of Pigs operation aimed at overthrowing Castro. The
Kennedy administration mounted a second covert
action to remove Castro, Operation MONGOOSE. This
operation was pursued vigorously despite intelligence
indicating that efforts to create an internal opposition
strong enough to overthrow Castro were just not
working. This mind-set even led to some consideration
of assassinating Castro.
Once the missiles were discovered, it was clear to
the author and others in the Office of National Estimates
(ONE) that President Kennedy was unwavering in his
policy commitment to remove the missiles from Cuba,
either by diplomacy backed by a show of military force,
or direct U.S. military action. The President announced
this policy to the world in a remarkable crisis speech on
October 22, 1962. All of the information and feedback
the ONE staff received as a result of White House
briefings attended by senior intelligence officials
clearly indicated that it had been decided the missiles
must be removed. Based on the evidence discussed
in this monograph and the author’s recollection, a
U.S. bombardment and airborne invasion of Cuba
were within 48 to 72 hours of being launched when
Khrushchev announced publicly on October 28, 1962,
that he would remove the missiles. On November 20,
1962, he also announced that he would withdraw the
Soviet IL-28 bombers and the tactical nuclear weapons
that had also been sent to Cuba. (Nuclear warheads for
the missiles and nuclear bombs for the IL-28 bombers
were also removed.)
In the end, faulty intelligence assessments and
erroneous policy mind-sets were overcome when at
4

the insistence of the DCI, U-2 reconnaissance flights
resumed over the interior of Cuba. Using intelligence
provided clandestinely by an on-island espionage
agent, the U-2 photographed the first SS-4 missile site
on October 14. (Annex C contains information on some
of the Soviet and U.S. intelligence sources that were
operational during the crisis; and basic definitions of
clandestine operations.)
THE SEEDS OF CRISIS—1961
The year 1961 was not a good year for the United
States in the Cold War. On April 12, Soviet Cosmonaut
Major Yuri Gagarin was the first person to orbit the
earth in outer space. This event fueled speculation
that the Soviets were ahead of the United States in the
development of ballistic missiles.1
A counterintelligence failure came to light when
British intelligence officer George Blake was arrested
for espionage on April 4. He had been working for the
Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) since 1953.
There was also the tragic failure at the Bay of Pigs, as
CIA-trained and equipped Cuban exiles invaded Cuba
in an attempt to overthrow Castro. Planning for this
operation began in 1960, with President Eisenhower’s
concurrence, and President Kennedy approved it.
Castro announced the defeat of this operation on April
20, 1961.
Other threatening events included the failure of
the June 1961 summit with Khrushchev in Vienna;
the building of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961;
Khrushchev’s threat to turn over access to West
Berlin to the Communist East German regime; and
Khrushchev’s unilateral resumption of nuclear testing
in the atmosphere in early September contrary to the
promise he made to Kennedy at the Vienna summit.2
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Despite all of these negative events, there was
a good, albeit secret, development. Colonel Oleg
Penkovsky was a Soviet army officer assigned to the
Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Upravlenie (GRU), the chief
intelligence directorate of the general staff. On April
20, 1961, he arrived in London as the head of a sixman Soviet delegation from the State Committee for
the Coordination of Scientific Research Work. This
committee served as a cover for KGB and GRU officers
who were conducting espionage to steal Western
technology. However, Penkovsky had the intent of
volunteering his services to the CIA and MI-6, and
he was successful with the help of his host, British
businessman Greville Wynne, who was cooperating
with British Intelligence.3
The information received from Penkovsky was
tightly held. There is no evidence that either Attorney
General Robert Kennedy or the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs (i.e., National Security
Advisor) McGeorge Bundy knew about Penkovsky or
the importance of his information. The President knew
of Penkovsky, however, and took a personal interest in
the “Soviet colonel’s work.” DCI Allen Dulles showed
the President copies of Penkovsky’s information,
including verbatim transcripts of clandestine meetings
with him. Dulles’s successor, John McCone, continued
to keep the President informed of the status of this case
after he became DCI in November 1961.4
CIA and MI-6 officers met with Penkovsky for
about 140 hours during his two trips to London and
one to Paris. About 1,200 pages of transcripts were
produced. He supplied 111 exposed rolls of film, 99
percent of which were legible. An estimated 10,000
pages or more of intelligence reports were produced
from his information, which included the top secret
operating manuals for the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. The
6

manuals had been clandestinely photographed by
Penkovsky in Moscow and passed to the CIA and MI-6
in clandestine meetings in London in 1961.
By comparing the U-2 photography with information in the manuals provided by Penkovsky, analysts
were able to identify positively the specific missiles
being placed in Cuba and to determine on a daily basis
the stage of construction of each missile site. They
were, therefore, able to tell President Kennedy when
each site would become operational. This information
was critical in enabling the President to know how
much time he had to determine and apply a policy of
diplomatic and military pressure against Khrushchev
before having to take direct military action.5
Penkovsky was one of the most important
espionage agents of the Cold War. During his brief yet
remarkable career, he was run jointly by the CIA and
the British MI-6. Wynne served as a principal agent in
contacting Penkovsky on behalf of both agencies. He
arranged clandestine meetings with Penkovsky in both
London and Paris in 1961 and was used to pass and
receive information from Penkovsky during visits to
Moscow. Brush contacts for exchanging messages with
Penkovsky in Moscow were also arranged utilizing the
wife of an MI-6 officer stationed in Moscow. Penkovsky
came under suspicion by the KGB in about January 1962
and was never allowed to visit the West again. He also
lost his access to high level Soviet military and political
leaders. Pravda announced his arrest on December 12,
1962. The KGB would later claim that the actual date
of his arrest was October 22, 1962. After a show trial
in Moscow, Penkovsky’s execution was announced on
May 17, 1963.6
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Soviet Deception.
In May 1961, an American journalist introduced
Georgi Nikitovich Bolshakov to Attorney General
Robert Kennedy. Bolshakov claimed a direct channel
to Khrushchev. Bolshakov was, in fact, a Soviet GRU
officer in Washington under cover as information
counselor and editor of the magazine, Soviet Life. There
is evidence of at least 51 meetings between Kennedy
and Bolshakov between May 1961 and December
1962.7
Robert Kennedy ignored warnings from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the CIA that
Bolshakov was a Soviet intelligence officer and thought
that he had an authentic friendship with Bolshakov. He
regarded Bolshakov as Khrushchev’s representative
but failed to realize that Bolshakov was being used to
pass disinformation to the President.
Using the Bolshakov channel, the President was led
to believe that Khrushchev would be willing to make
concessions on nuclear testing and on Laos if Kennedy
were to agree to a summit meeting. Kennedy agreed
to a summit meeting in Vienna on June 3-4, 1961.
Although Khrushchev and Kennedy agreed to make a
cease-fire in Laos a priority, nothing else was resolved
in Vienna. Khrushchev promised to end testing of
nuclear weapons in the atmosphere but violated this
pledge by unilaterally resuming atmospheric testing in
early September 1961.
The Vienna Summit.
The Vienna Summit failed when Khrushchev
threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with
East Germany which would cancel all existing
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commitments among the four Allied powers of World
War II, including occupation rights, administrative
institutions, and rights of access to East and West
Berlin. Khrushchev’s treaty would establish the “free”
city of West Berlin. There would be no interference
with its internal affairs or its communications, but an
agreement on access would have to be reached with the
German Democratic Republic (the GDR or Communist
East Germany). Western troops would be acceptable in
West Berlin under certain conditions—and, of course,
with Soviet troops, too. “And if there is any attempt to
interfere with these plans,” Khrushchev added, “there
will be war.” Kennedy looked straight at Khrushchev
and said, “Then, Mr. Chairman, there will be war. It
will be a cold winter.”8
Kennedy met privately with James “Scotty” Reston,
Washington bureau chief of the New York Times, in
the American embassy in Vienna immediately after
the summit to discuss what happened. Concerning
Khrushchev’s threats of war, he told Reston,
I think he did it because of the Bay of Pigs. . . . I think he
thought that anyone who was so young and inexperienced
as to get into that mess could be taken, and anyone who
got into it and didn’t see it through had no guts. So he
just beat hell out of me. So I’ve got a terrible problem. If
he thinks I’m inexperienced and have no guts, until we
remove those ideas we won’t get anywhere with him. So
we have to act.

Reston did not publish Kennedy’s remarks until
well after the missile crisis. The author also has no
recollection that Kennedy’s assessment of Khrushchev
as expressed to Reston was ever shared with the Board
or ONE. Had Kennedy’s own personal assessment of
Khrushchev’s behavior been published or disseminated
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to the American IC sooner, the IC might have gotten
an early sense of the dangerous mind-set which led
Khrushchev to conclude that he could get away with
placing offensive missiles in Cuba without triggering a
U.S. military response.9
Former President Eisenhower tried to warn
Kennedy during a conversation after the Bay of Pigs.
Eisenhower asked Kennedy why he had failed to
provide air cover for the landing of the CIA-trained
Cuban exile force in Cuba. Kennedy responded that
he had been worried the Soviets would make trouble
in Berlin. Eisenhower replied, “That is exactly the
opposite of what would really happen. The Soviets
follow their own plans, and if they see us show any
weakness, then is when they press the hardest. . . . The
failure of the Bay of Pigs will embolden the Soviets to
do something that they would otherwise not do.” Later,
Arkady Shevchenko of the Soviet Foreign Ministry
reported that the Bay of Pigs “gave Khrushchev and
the other leaders the impression that Kennedy was
indecisive.”10
Khrushchev’s assessment of Kennedy at the
Vienna Summit was shared by other Soviets. Fyodor
Burlatsky, one of Khrushchev’s assistants, was present
at Khrushchev’s debriefing after the Vienna Summit.
Burlatsky thought that Kennedy seemed to Khrushchev
more like “an adviser, not a political decisionmaker or
president. Maybe in a crisis he would be an adviser, but
not even the most influential.” He thought Khrushchev
looked down on Kennedy as a self-made man looks
down on a rich man to whom all has been handed. At
a conference in 1988, Burlatsky said that “Khrushchev
thought Kennedy too young, intellectual, not prepared
well for decision making in crisis situations . . . too
intelligent and too weak.”11

10

Khrushchev’s superiority mind-set was further
illustrated during a meeting on September 7, 1962,
between Khrushchev and American poet Robert
Frost. Construction had already secretly begun on
SS-5 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM)
sites in Guanajay, Cuba. From September 15-20,
1962, construction would begin at San Cristobal on
SS-4 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) sites.
Khrushchev told Frost that the Western democracies
were “too liberal to fight.” President Kennedy’s
perceived lack of confidence during the failed Bay
of Pigs invasion had convinced Khrushchev that
Kennedy was “wishy-washy. . . . I know for certain
that Kennedy doesn’t have a strong backbone, nor,
generally speaking, does he have the courage to stand
up to a serious challenge.”12
But Khrushchev’s remarks to Frost reveal more than
just a mind-set formed by Kennedy’s handling of the
Bay of Pigs, Kennedy’s behavior at the Vienna Summit
in June 1961, and the failure of the Western allies to
react strongly to erecting the Berlin Wall on August
13, 1961. Khrushchev’s assessment of Kennedy and
the West was at least partially formed by communist
ideology. The statement that the Western democracies
are too liberal to fight is a communist tenet derived
from the belief that history is on the side of socialism
and communism and that the noncommunist capitalist
West was weak and decadent. To a certain extent,
Khrushchev was a true believer, and this mind-set
influenced his assessment of events and other political
leaders.13
Some of the people close to Kennedy had the
same understanding of Khrushchev’s assessment
of Kennedy. Looking back in 1987, George Ball said
“we all thought that Khrushchev saw him as young
and weak.” General Maxwell Taylor recalled that “the
11

meeting of Khrushchev with President Kennedy in
Vienna had so impressed him [Khrushchev] with the
unreadiness of this young man to head a great country
like the United States, plus the experience that he had
seen in the Bay of Pigs [led him to believe that] he could
shove this young man around any place he wanted.”14
Following the Vienna Summit, Kennedy did, in
fact, take a series of actions in an effort to disabuse
Khrushchev of this assessment. But none of these
actions succeeded in changing Khrushchev’s personal
mind-set toward Kennedy or his ideological superiority
mind-set toward the United States. In a revelation
of its own mind-set, the IC issued a Special National
Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on September 19, 1962,
which concluded that Khrushchev would not run the
risk of placing offensive missiles in Cuba because this
“would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date
and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It
would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the
level of risk in U.S.-Soviet relations than the USSR has
displayed thus far.” But this mind-set persisted even
though Khrushchev had already increased the level
of risk in U.S. Soviet relations by his conduct at the
June 1961 summit in Vienna; his threat to turn over
the administration of Berlin to East Germany; erecting
the Berlin Wall; and his testing nuclear weapons in
the atmosphere contrary to his promise to Kennedy in
Vienna.15
TECHNICAL COLLECTION VERSUS ESPIONAGE
In June 1961, an NIE concluded that the Soviets had
50-100 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on
launchers. But Edward W. Proctor, chief of the ad hoc
Guided Missile Task Force in the the CIA’s Directorate
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of Intelligence, prepared a June 2, 1961, memorandum
in which he stated that, based on the implications of a
Clandestine Service report dated May 16, 1961 entitled
“The Soviet ICBM Program,” the previous NIE should
be withdrawn and its conclusions reversed.
Proctor’s memorandum was based on information
Penkovsky had clandestinely provided the CIA and
MI-6. Proctor argued that based on this Clandestine
Service report, the Soviets had not been conducting a
generally successful ICBM program, and that they did
not have 50-100 operational ICBM launchers at present.
They probably had 25 or fewer ICBMs on launchers.
By mid-1962 they would have only 25-50 ICBMs on
launchers versus the 100-200 that were projected in the
June 1961 NIE.16
But Proctor also stated that there was a need
for more information about the unknown source’s
credentials “because acceptance of his report as an
accurate reflection of the status of the Soviet ICBM
program will modify substantially our estimate and
could cause important changes in U.S. policy. It is
necessary that we who are assessing this program have
access to almost all the information available so that
we can make an independent judgment of the validity
of this report.” But after serious consideration by Dick
Helms, CIA Chief of Operations for the Directorate
of Plans; and Jack Maury, the CIA Chief of the Soviet
Division in the Directorate of Plans, the decision was
made against revealing further details that might point
to the source of the report.17
No revision of the estimated number of Soviet
strategic missiles was made to this June 1961 updated
NIE. Although Penkovsky’s information was included
in the information given to the U.S. Intelligence Board
(USIB) for its June 1961 update, only a brief mention was
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made of the report in a footnote. Members of the USIB
did not argue with the Clandestine Service’s evaluation
of the source (Penkovsky). But a USIB member told
Jack Maury that no matter how good the source was,
the sub-source was unknown to consumers and was
given no evaluation in the dissemination. Because of
this, the sub-source “would have to be considered ‘F’.
The community was unwilling to accord an ‘F’ source
any consideration in changing a National Estimate.”
An “F” in this case meant unsubstantiated information.
The sub-source from whom Penkovsky acquired
the information was Marshal Sergei Sergeyevitch
Varentsov, Chief Marshal of Artillery and a mentor of
Penkovsky. Varentsov was not named in the report for
security reasons.18
A member of the USIB also recalled that “nobody
wanted to accept it [Penkovsky’s information] because
it was so contrary to their established views and political
positions, especially the Air Force. A revision would
mean a change in their budget.” This is a good example
of how the power of government budgets can create
and sustain status quo mind-sets. It also illustrates
how a budgetary mind-set then worked to downgrade
intelligence that contradicted and threatened the basis
for the budget.19
Howard Stoertz, the Board of National Estimates
officer in charge of estimating the Soviet strategic
missile program, recalled in a 1989 interview that:
[Though] we had a lot of technical information . . . it was
incomplete. [It was] in some respects contradictory, and
it was difficult to interpret. The Penkovsky information
was the only piece of inside information that I can recall
about Soviet thinking and planning about intercontinental
missiles. His information said the Soviet Union did have
a big program—like our other information indicated—
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but that it was proceeding much more slowly than we
had forecast. That was the critical explanation.20

Stoertz said that the CIA had told him that the source
and his material were authentic. But he had no basis
for making a judgment.
If I had a photo taken by a U-2, I knew what it was. There
was an interpreter who could tell me what was being
seen. I could never talk to this source [Penkovsky] and
could never find out anything about who he was. That
was protecting his life, but to that extent it somewhat
diminished the utility of it to me. I accepted their word,
but I was looking for other confirmation.21

This explanation by Stoertz is an excellent illustration of the analytic mind-set that favors intelligence
collected by technical means versus intelligence
acquired from human espionage sources. Even if the
source and sub-source had been revealed to Stoertz and
other senior analysts, it is doubtful that the espionage
of Penkovsky would have changed the mind-set that
produced the June 1961 NIE without confirmation by
U-2 or other technical collection operations.
All U-2 flights over the USSR had ceased following
the shoot-down on May 1, 1960, of the U-2 flown by
Francis Gary Powers. But the CIA Discoverer Satellite
Reconnaissance Program, also known as Corona,
had begun in 1958. After a series of failures, it began
to produce photos of the USSR in August 1960. On
September 6, 1961, the CIA issued a report which
stated “we now believe that our present estimate of
50-100 operational ICBM launchers as of mid-1961 is
probably too high.” Thus Penkovsky’s intelligence was
correct but accepted only after confirmation by satellite
photography. This again illustrates the dilemma of how
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properly to assess and evaluate limited, albeit likely
accurate, intelligence from espionage sources, when
information from other sources including technical
collection is not yet available to confirm it.22
But it was also the information supplied by
Penkovsky that enabled the photographs to be
evaluated in detail and the precise capability of the
SS-5 MRBMs and other missiles to be made known to
the President. Without this information, the President
would not have known how much time he had to
negotiate before taking military action to destroy the
missiles.23
The information that Penkovsky provided on film
and in written and oral form was consistently highly
evaluated up to and including the last material received
from him on August 27, 1962. As of August 1963, the
Penkovsky operation was described (by the CIA) as
“the most productive classic clandestine operation
ever conducted by the CIA or MI-6 against the Soviet
target.” According to authors Schecter and Deriabin,
30 years later, that judgment still holds.24
The purpose of espionage is to recruit foreign agents
who have access to and report highly sensitive and
protected intelligence, often prior to such information
being available from other sources. Espionage
information might be high level such as the missile
manuals provided by Penkovsky or critical order of
battle of information such as that provided by our
espionage agent in Cuba who provided the location of
an SS-4 missile site, which was then confirmed by U-2
photography. It is important, therefore, to find ways to
share with senior analysts additional information about
espionage sources and sub-sources to strengthen the
credibility of their intelligence. Such information is now
being shared extensively with analysts, particularly
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within centers such as the National Intelligence
Council and the National Counterterrorism Center.
Nevertheless, analysts must still understand that
information from espionage agents with significant
access may not be as abundant as intelligence from
technical sources, but may well be acquired first and
be just as accurate. The challenge for analysts and
policymakers is to overcome previous mind-sets.
They must be prepared to assess accurately and utilize
espionage intelligence to preempt or mitigate crisis or
disaster prior to receiving additional information from
technical sources.25
KHRUSHCHEV PUSHES THE ENVELOPE
After the failed Vienna Summit with Khrushchev,
President Kennedy gave a major speech on July 25, 1961,
in which he outlined a significant increase in American
nuclear forces, an increase in conventional forces in
West Germany, and a call-up of military reservists in
the United States. These steps had been recommended
by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson at a National
Security Council (NSC) meeting on June 29, 1961. They
were also in line with Kennedy’s recognition that he
had to act to correct Khrushchev’s assessment of him
at the Vienna Summit. But Kennedy’s hard-line speech
and actions did not work. The Berlin Wall went up on
August 13, 1961.26
The construction of the Berlin Wall was an
intelligence failure. The United States and its allies
were caught by surprise. Penkovsky told the CIA and
MI-6 officers during a clandestine meeting in Paris in
September 1961 that he had learned of plans to erect
the wall 4 days before it went up; however, he had
no secure way of communicating this information
to us in Moscow. If President Kennedy had known
17

of Khrushchev’s intentions, he could have exposed
the plan and possibly forced the Soviets to abort the
mission. At the very least, the West Germans could
have been alerted. Once the wall went up, the United
States and its allies accepted it as a fait accompli. This
lack of action certainly played into Khrushchev’s
mind-set that Western democracies were “too liberal
to fight,” as he was to state to Robert Frost over a year
later.27
Khrushchev unilaterally resumed nuclear testing
in the atmosphere on September 1, 1961. This violated
the commitment Khrushchev made to Kennedy at the
Vienna Summit that he would not be the first to resume
such nuclear testing. A new NIE issued on September
21, 1961, based on Penkovsky’s intelligence and
photographs from the first generation Corona satellite,
projected that the Soviets had fewer than 35 ICBMs.
The NIE concluded that there was no missile gap. The
United States had nuclear superiority over the USSR.28
INTELLIGENCE USED TO WARN KHRUSHCHEV
On October 17, 1961, the 22d Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union opened in
Moscow. On October 21, 1961, while that Congress was
still in session, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell
Gilpatric gave a speech to the Business Council at
White Sulfur Springs, West Virginia. The speech was
coordinated by McGeorge Bundy, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, and approved
by President Kennedy. It called Khrushchev’s bluff
concerning alleged Soviet nuclear superiority. Gilpatric
said, “In short, we have a second-strike capability
which is at least as extensive as what the Soviets can
deliver by striking first. Therefore, we are confident
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that the Soviets will not provoke a major nuclear
attack.” Khrushchev did back down from his threat
to Kennedy at the Vienna Summit, to sign “one way
or another before this year is out,” a separate peace
treaty with East Germany. He said that the timing of
an agreement “was no longer important.”29
But at this same 22d Party Congress in October
1961, Soviet Defense Minister Rodian Malinovsky
stated that Khrushchev’s 1960 speech to the Supreme
Soviet was now the basis of Soviet military doctrine.
Malinovsky made it clear that because nuclear missiles
were now central to Soviet doctrine, all other services
had to be shaped to prepare for nuclear war. According
to Khrushchev’s 1960 speech, the Soviet Union was
prepared to fight a nuclear war, to survive the inevitable
heavy casualties, and to win. The West, on the other
hand, would not survive: for them nuclear war would
mean the end of capitalism. In Khrushchev’s mind,
the end of capitalism and the victory of socialism were
inevitable.
This 1960 speech was to be the beginning of a new
era for Soviet policy, which favored nuclear missiles.
At the same time, Khrushchev announced a plan to
reduce Soviet troops by 1.2 million men.30
KENNEDY LAUNCHES OPERATION
MONGOOSE
At the end of November 1961, President Kennedy
issued a top secret order launching what became known
as Operation MONGOOSE, “to use our available assets
. . . to help Cuba overthrow the communist regime.” The
head of operations for MONGOOSE, General Edward
Lansdale, reported to a new Special Group 5412
(augmented), under the direction of Attorney General
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Robert Kennedy. President Kennedy constantly pushed
the CIA to devise new schemes for undermining the
Castro regime. MONGOOSE also included a series
of plans to assassinate Castro. It was a governmentwide operation involving almost all executive branch
agencies. The MONGOOSE operations undertaken by
the CIA were entrusted to a newly formed “Task Force
W” in the CIA. Although the CIA officers assumed that
the President knew of the assassination plans, there is
no surviving documentary proof of this.31
The Special Group was initially conceived to
provide authorization for every significant CIA covert
action operation as specified by National Security
Directive 5412/2. Under President Kennedy, members
of the Special Group included the Deputy Secretary
of Defense; the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs; General Maxwell Taylor, the President’s
military advisor; National Security Advisor McGeorge
Bundy; and the DCI. Once this group became the center
of all policy and operational activity concerning Cuba,
Robert Kennedy added himself to this list.32
In November 1961, new DCI John McCone
appointed Richard Helms to be the DCI’s “man for
Cuba.” Helms, then the acting Deputy Director for
Plans (DDP), was subsequently fully appointed the
DDP in February 1962. As DDP, Helms was the head of
the CIA’s clandestine service. Helms placed all Cuban
operations in Task Force W under the command of Bill
Harvey who reported directly to him. In January 1962,
at a meeting in the attorney general’s office, Robert
Kennedy informed the senior representatives of the
various agencies supporting MONGOOSE that Castro’s
removal from office and a change in government in
Cuba were then the primary foreign policy objectives of
the Kennedy administration. Repeated blunt references
to “eliminating” Castro raised the question of political
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assassination in peace time. According to Helms, “None
of these efforts, which were first considered under the
Eisenhower administration, offered anything but the
slightest promise and, predictably, none went more
than a step beyond the initial proposals.”
Helms related that under relentless pressure from
Robert Kennedy, the CIA effort under Operation
MONGOOSE eventually involved some 600 CIA
staff employees and between 4,000 and 5,000 contract
personnel. The CIA activity ranged from establishing a
refugee interrogation center to a variety of sabotage and
collection operations. The steady flow of intelligence
showed that Castro’s military and internal security and
foreign intelligence services continued to gain strength,
but did not lessen the determination of the President
and Robert Kennedy to even the score with Castro
over the Bay of Pigs. According to Helms, “However
ambitious, our sabotage efforts never amounted to
more than pinpricks. The notion than an underground
resistance might be created on the island remained a
remote, romantic myth.”
At the annual review of MONGOOSE by Robert
Kennedy on October 15, 1962, he expressed the
President’s general dissatisfaction with the operation.
The results were very discouraging. There had been
no successful acts of sabotage, and one such effort
had failed twice. The President had acknowledged
that there had been “a noticeable improvement . . . in
the collection of intelligence but that other action had
failed to influence significantly the course of events in
Cuba.” According to Helms, the attorney general went
on to point out that “despite the fact that secretaries
Rusk and McNamara, DCI McCone, General Maxwell
Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and he [Robert Kennedy]
personally had been charged by President Kennedy
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with finding a solution, only small accomplishments
had been made.”
The following day, October 16, 1962, the President
was briefed on the U-2 photography of Sunday, October
14, which showed that the Soviets were placing MRBMs
known as SS-4s at three different sites in western Cuba.
MONGOOSE was temporarily overtaken by the Cuban
Missile Crisis.33
KHRUSHCHEV DECIDES TO PUT MISSILES IN
CUBA
In March 1962, Castro dismantled the Cuban
Communist Party and was, at his request, given a new
Soviet ambassador, Ambassador Aleksandr Ivanovich
Shitov (alias Alekseev), who was the KGB chief, or
resident, in Havana.34
Shortly thereafter, in the spring of 1962, Khrushchev
decided to place offensive missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev
said he made the decision during a vacation trip to
Bulgaria on May 14-20, 1962. Former Chief of Staff
of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces General Anatoly
Gribkov said he received orders in Moscow on May 18,
1962, to prepare a document proposing the placement
of MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba. On May 20, 1962,
Khrushchev returned to Moscow, and on May 24, 1962,
the Soviet Politburo and the Soviet Defense Council
met and approved the proposal in principle.35
In May of 1962, two advisors warned Khrushchev
against putting offensive missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev
told First Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan
that he would secretly install missiles in September
and October, but would not reveal this until after the
November 1962 U.S. elections. At that time, Soviet
Ambassador Dobrynin would deliver a letter to
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President Kennedy announcing the existence of the
missiles in Cuba. He expected Kennedy to accept the
situation, as the Soviets had accepted U.S. missiles in
Turkey. Mikoyan doubted the operation could be kept
secret, he doubted that Castro would agree, and he
doubted that the Americans would accept the missiles.
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told Khrushchev
that “putting missiles into Cuba would cause a
political explosion in the United States. I am absolutely
certain of that, and this should be taken into account.”
Khrushchev did not heed these warnings.36
Thus Khrushchev decided to place offensive missiles
in Cuba not only in spite of Kennedy’s actions since the
June 1961 Vienna summit, but also despite warnings
from two senior advisors. In retrospect, it is difficult
to imagine under these circumstances what the United
States could have done to cause Khrushchev to change
his mind. His mind-set embraced the supremacy of
communist ideology, supported by the perceived
weakness of Kennedy to such an extent that he even
ignored the blunt advice of both his Foreign Minister
and his First Deputy Prime Minister.37
On May 29, 1962, a high-level Soviet delegation
arrived in Cuba posing as agricultural specialists
to discuss the decision with Castro. The delegation
included Commander of Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces
Marshal Sergei S. Biryuzov. The Soviets classified
strategic missiles as those with a range of over 1,000
kilometers, or about 600 miles. Mobile tactical missiles
with nuclear warheads had a range of under 600 miles,
and were controlled by Marshal Sergei Sergeyevitch
Varentsov, Chief Marshal of Artillery. According to
intelligence provided by Penkovsky, these tactical
nuclear warheads were always kept in special storage
depots guarded by elite KGB troops and could be
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distributed only after a decision by the Military Council
headed by Khrushchev.38
At first, Castro refused to say whether he agreed
with Khrushchev’s offer to place the missiles in Cuba.
After consulting with his inner circle the next day,
Castro agreed with the plan as a gesture to improve the
position of the Socialist Camp in the international arena,
and not as a desperate ploy to prevent a U.S. attack.
Castro did not want the Cuban people or the world to
believe that Cuba could not defend itself. The Soviet
delegation returned to Moscow. Final Soviet approval
was given at a meeting of the Soviet Presidium on June
10, 1962. Troops for the Soviet surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs) were sent to Cuba first.39
KHRUSHCHEV EXPLAINS HIS DECISION
Khrushchev recounted in his memoirs that
he decided to place offensive missiles in Cuba
for three reasons: to protect Cuba from a second
“counterrevolutionary invasion” by the United States
(the first was the Bay of Pigs in April 1961); to equalize
“what the West calls ‘the balance of power’,” and to
protect “Soviet prestige” in Latin America. Khrushchev
worried that “if we lose Cuba . . . it would be a terrible
blow to Marxism-Leninism. It would gravely diminish
our stature throughout the world, but especially in
Latin America.”40
One can argue which of these three motives was the
most important to Khrushchev. The author believes that
the prospect of closing the missile gap with the United
States by installing missiles in Cuba only 90 miles
from it was the overriding strategic consideration for
Khrushchev. Khrushchev discourses at length about
the American missiles which “were aimed against us in
Turkey and Italy, to say nothing of West Germany.”41
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Yet in a written message to President Kennedy
during the crisis, Khrushchev insisted that “we had
installed the missiles with the goal of defending
Cuba and that we were not pursuing any other aims
except to deter an invasion of Cuba.” But Khrushchev
also admits elsewhere, “I’m not saying we had any
documentary proof that the Americans were preparing
a second invasion; we didn’t need documentary proof.
We knew the class affiliation, the class blindness, of
the United States, and that was enough to make us
expect the worst.” This is an excellent example of how
Khrushchev’s own words revealed his ideological
mind-set, which even dismissed the need for intelligence
and “documentary proof” about actual U.S. plans and
intentions.
The only “second invasion,” however, about
which the author acquired any knowledge during his
assignment in ONE and his work on the missile crisis,
was the U.S. plan to bomb and invade Cuba to remove
the missiles Khrushchev had installed there in the first
place.42 Some historians have written that “frightened
by U.S. belligerency,” Castro asked Khrushchev for
military help, and Khrushchev responded by sending
a large amount of sophisticated weaponry including
offensive missiles to Cuba in the summer of 1962. The
erroneous implication here is that it was Castro who
was forced by “U.S. belligerency” to seek the missiles,
and therefore, the United States was responsible for
the Cuban Missile Crisis.43
But Khrushchev makes it very clear that the decision
to put the missiles in Cuba was his and his alone. He
states that during his vacation to Bulgaria that spring,
he “had the idea of installing missiles with nuclear
warheads in Cuba. . . . I knew that first we’d have to
talk to Castro and explain our strategy to him in order
to get the agreement of the Cuban government.” In
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fact, Khrushchev recounts how he had arguments with
Castro over this plan, but in the end Castro agreed to
go along with placing missiles in Cuba.44
THE SOVIET PLAN
Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky’s
presentation to the Presidium on June 10, 1962, made
it clear that the Soviet military viewed the Cuban
operation (code named ANADYR) as much an
opportunity to project Soviet power into the Western
Hemisphere as a rescue mission for Castro. The
Presidium voted unanimously to accept the plan as
put forth by Malinovsky. Under the plan, the Soviets
would deploy 24 MRBMs and 16 IRBMs and would
put half that many of each in reserve. The 40 missiles
would be taken from units in the Ukraine and European
Russia. Once installed in Cuba, they would double the
number of Soviet nuclear missiles that could reach the
U.S. mainland.
The Soviets would also send two cruise missile
regiments which also carried nuclear warheads. They
planned to send 80 of these missiles (16 launchers with
five rockets each) to defend the Cuban shoreline and the
region neighboring the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo.
Each of these missiles had a range of about 90 miles
and a nuclear charge equivalent to between 5.6 and 12
kilotons of TNT. The Soviets called these cruise missiles
“frontoviye krilatiye raketi” or FKR.
The Soviets would also send to Cuba four motorized
regiments, two tank battalions, a MiG-21 fighter
wing, 42 IL-28 light bombers, 12 SA-2 units (with
144 launchers), and some antiaircraft gun batteries.
Each motorized regiment had 2,500 men, and the
two battalions would be outfitted with the T-55, the
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newest Soviet tank. The plan envisaged sending a total
of 50,874 military personnel to Cuba. This structure
would be an innovation for the Soviet military, which
had never before included ballistic missiles in an army
group.
The Soviet navy would also build a submarine base
in Cuba, complete with facilities for the new Soviet
ballistic missile submarine. To defend Cuba’s shores,
the Soviets would send two cruisers, four destroyers,
and 12 Komar patrol boats each with two conventional
R-15 missiles with a range of 10 miles. They would send
11 submarines, including seven that carried nucleartipped missiles, to patrol the East Coast of the United
States.45
CRISIS WITHOUT OUR BEST ESPIONAGE
AGENT
In July 1962, the KGB Second Chief Directorate
(counterintelligence) broke out recorded conversations
between Penkovsky and Wynne in a Moscow hotel
room. (Penkovsky had turned on the radio and
bathroom taps in an effort to defeat audio surveillance.)
Wynne had been operating as a cutout and courier
between Penkovsky and his CIA and MI-6 case officers.
The hotel room conversation revealed that Penkovsky
was an espionage agent for the West. The KGB placed
Penkovsky’s apartment under surveillance.
A camera was secretly placed in an adjacent
apartment, and a pinhead camera was placed in the
apartment above his flat. The KGB then placed poison
on his chair to create a medical reason for sending
Penkovsky and family away for medical recuperation.
They searched his apartment and found spy gear;
however, the KGB did not arrest Penkovsky. They
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kept him under surveillance in an effort to identify
other persons who might be involved. Penkovsky also
lost his access to senior Soviet military officials such as
Varentsov just when the United States most needed that
access and the intelligence it could have produced.46
SOVIET WEAPONS AND DCI WARNINGS
As it became increasingly clear that Soviet-supplied
arms were flowing into Cuba, Soviet merchant shipping
came under close scrutiny. Photographs of ships en
route to Cuba were taken by a variety of organizations
from various vantage points: from shore, from other
ships, and from aircraft flying at low, intermediate,
and high altitudes. The Soviets attempted to conceal
and protect these shipments by covering the weapons
with packing crates or by placing them in shipping
containers. All of this photography was sent to the
National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC)
for analysis. The science of measuring, identifying,
and cataloguing the crates and their contents became
known as “cratology” and had been firmly established
as an intelligence technique by the time of the Cuban
Missile Crisis.47 From July 25-31, 1962, a surge of Soviet
arms shipments began to arrive in western Cuban
ports. Then from August 1-5, construction began on
SA-2 SAM sites in Matanzas, Havana, Mariel, Bahia
Honda, Santa Lucia, San Julian, and La Coloma.48
Soviet military equipment and personnel were
being sent to Cuba under an extensive denial and
deception plan (known as Maskirovka in Russian).
Soviets traveled to Cuba posing as machine operators,
irrigation specialists, and agricultural specialists. Radio
Moscow claimed that the Soviets were only giving Cuba
“machine tools, wheat, and agricultural machinery,”
along with “some 7,000 tons of fertilizers.” But because
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there was such secrecy surrounding the shipment of
equipment concealed in crates and the movement at
night of Soviet personnel and equipment from Cuban
ports, no one in the ONE ever believed that the buildup was only agricultural. Maskirovka may have been
effective in fooling persons in the Soviet government,
including many of those actually involved in the
shipment of the weapons. But no one whom the author
knew in ONE ever doubted that a military build-up
was underway.
Once we detected the installation of the SA-2 SAM
sites in early August, the agricultural specialist cover
of the Soviets streaming into Cuba was irretrievably
blown. Moreover, the claim that the CIA paid no
attention to information on the build-up that was
allowed by the Cuban Government to flood Miami
exile circles or that was obtained from debriefing Cuban
refugees was just not true. In fact, some of the best
human intelligence (HUMINT) reports we received
were from exile and refugee sources. Two such reports
are discussed later in this paper. But what we did not
know from the beginning was just how extensive the
military build-up would eventually become. The key
question which ONE debated from the beginning
was whether the build-up eventually would include
offensive missiles that would pose a threat to our
national security.49
On August 1, 1962, President Kennedy announced
that the United States was willing to agree to a system
of national control posts, subject to international
supervision, for monitoring a nuclear test ban, which
was a significant U.S. concession. Then 4 days later,
on August 5, 1962, Khrushchev again resumed testing
nuclear weapons in the atmosphere by detonating a
40-megaton explosion in the Arctic.50
From August 10-23, 1962, DCI McCone warned
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President Kennedy a total of four times that he thought
the Soviets intended to place offensive missiles in
Cuba. On August 10, McCone attended a meeting
with Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense
McNamara, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Taylor, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and others. McCone
speculated that the influx of military equipment into
Cuba could be used as support for the MRBMs.51
On that same day, McCone dictated a memo
to President Kennedy expressing the belief that
“installations for the launching of offensive missiles
were being constructed on the island.”52 Then on
August 17, 1962, McCone attended an NSC meeting
that President Kennedy also attended. McCone again
argued that the Soviets must be placing surface-tosurface missiles in Cuba. According to McCone, Rusk
and McNamara expressed the view that the buildup
was purely defensive.53
On August 21, 1962, DCI McCone attended another
meeting with the same group that attended the August
10 meeting. He reported definite information on the
installation of SAMs in Cuba. He again speculated
on the probability of MRBMs being installed in Cuba.
McCone gave this same information in memo form
to President Kennedy the following day. On August
23, 1962, in a meeting with President Kennedy, Rusk,
McNamara, General Taylor, Bundy, and others,
McCone again reviewed the situation and questioned
the need for the extensive SAM installations unless
they were to “conceal” MRBMs.54
McCone’s argument was based on what he called
“a judgment factor.” He had no hard intelligence on
Soviet placement of offensive missiles in Cuba. But
Penkovsky had told his American and British case
officers in London in 1961 about Soviet plans to send
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SAMs to Cuba and had provided a copy of the detailed
manual on the capabilities of the SA-2. McCone asked
himself what the SAMs were protecting because they
were not protecting airfields, and he deduced that
there had to be strategic offensive missiles in Cuba.
The obvious purpose of the SAMs was to blind us so
we could not see what was going on there. There they
were with 16,000 men with all their ordnance equipment
and then came the ships. There was nothing else to ship
to Cuba but missiles. That was my argument. Other
reporting was received from clandestine agents and the
debriefing of refugees.

But as McCone said in a 1988 interview, “We didn’t
see the offensive missiles. They were on the ships,
and we had no agents on the ships. We really didn’t
know what was on the ships, but some things you can
deduce. That was one of them.”55
McCone departed Washington on August 23, 1962,
for his wedding in Seattle on August 29. He did not
return to Washington until after his honeymoon in
southern France on September 23.56 However, U-2
photography on the wedding date confirmed extensive
Soviet military deliveries to Cuba in recent weeks.
Included were at least eight Komar-class guided
missile patrol boats. These PT-like boats carry two
missile launchers each, with the radar-guided missile
effective against surface targets at ranges of between
15 and 17 miles. The missile carries a 2,000 pound high
explosive warhead.57
A more detailed readout of the August 29
photography revealed the existence of another kind of
missile site at Banes. It was concluded that the Banes
site was a facility for launching cruise missiles against
ship targets at fairly close range.58
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MORE SOVIET DECEPTION
On September 1, 1962, the USSR announced publicly
an agreement to supply arms and military technicians
to Cuba. At a press conference, reporters asked President
Kennedy for a comment on this announcement. He
said that the United States would employ “whatever
means may be necessary” to prevent aggression by
Cuba against any part of the Western Hemisphere. The
President added that “the evidence of Cuba’s military
buildup showed no significant offensive capability.”59
Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin met with
Attorney General Robert Kennedy on September 4,
1962. Robert Kennedy informed Dobrynin “of President
Kennedy’s deep concern about what was happening”
in Cuba. Dobrynin informed the attorney general
that he should not be concerned. Dobrynin said he
had been instructed by Khrushchev to assure President Kennedy that there would be no ground-to-ground
missiles or offensive weapons placed in Cuba. Kennedy
replied that it “would be of the gravest consequence if
the Soviet Union placed missiles in Cuba. That would
never happen, he [Dobrynin] assured me, and left.”
That same day, the President, after being briefed by
his brother, issued a public statement that there was
no evidence of “offensive ground-to-ground missiles”
or of “other significant offensive capability” in Cuba.
“Were it to be otherwise,” he warned, “the gravest
issues would arise.”60
A readout of U-2 photography taken on the next
day, September 5, revealed for the first time the
presence of MiG-21 jet aircraft in Cuba. One MiG-21
was spotted at Santa Clara airfield along with crates
for an additional 19 MiG-21s. The MiG-21 is a 1,000
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mile per hour jet, with an altitude capability of 60,000
feet, equipped with two air-to-air infrared missiles as
well as standard rockets and cannons. Cuba already
had about 60 MiG-15, -17, and -19 jet aircraft.61
FINAL COMMUNICATION WITH PENKOVSKY
On August 27, 1962, Penkovsky exchanged packages
with a CIA officer during a reception in the Moscow
apartment of an American agricultural attaché. The
exchange took place in a bathroom. Penkovsky’s
letter to the CIA described surveillance of himself
and of Wynne. He alleged that Wynne had invited
a Soviet boy and girl to his Moscow hotel room. He
also complained that Wynne never exchanged British
pounds for rubles as a normal businessman would
and said that Wynne actually took rubles from him.
Penkovsky then asked for a bigger resettlement bonus
and promised to continue to work for the CIA and MI6. The package he received from the CIA contained a
false Soviet internal passport with his photo, but in
the name of Vladimir Grigoryevich Butov. This was
for Penkovsky’s use should he want to make a run for
it.62
Penkovsky subsequently appeared at an American
embassy reception on September 5, 1962. There was
no opportunity to exchange messages. The next
day, Penkovsky appeared at the British Science and
Cultural Attaché offices for a film showing. Penkovsky
made eye contact with MI-6 Officer Gervase Cowell.
Cowell’s wife, Pamela, who was to be his new contact,
was not present. There was no exchange. This was the
last sighting of Penkovsky prior to his arrest.63
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ADDITIONAL SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Khrushchev began to secretly add to the nuclear
build-up in Cuba. The Soviets had planned to put
only one kind of tactical nuclear missile in Cuba, the
FKR cruise missile for coastal defense. But as tension
built, Soviet military leaders gave Khrushchev a list of
additional battlefield nuclear weapons which could be
used to counter a U.S. military invasion of Cuba. On
September 7, 1962, Khrushchev authorized sending six
atomic bombs for IL-28 bombers and three detachments
of LUNA tactical missiles. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) name for these tactical missiles
was FROG. This missile was solid-fueled and had a
range of 20-25 miles. Of the 36 LUNA missiles to be
sent to Cuba, 24 had conventional warheads. Twokiloton nuclear warheads would be sent for the other
12 missiles.
The next day, September 8, 1962, the Ministry
of Defense drafted an order delegating the Soviet
commander in Cuba, General Issa Pliyev, the authority
to use these tactical battlefield nuclear weapons should
communications with Moscow be cut and a U.S.-led
invasion be underway. However, Khrushchev had
already given Pliyev this authority orally during a
meeting in July. Malinovsky decided not to sign or
send the instructions to Pliyev in writing. According to
Gribkov, even this oral authority was later withdrawn
by Moscow in a cable sent to Pliyev hours before
Kennedy’s October 22, 1962, crisis speech, which
ordered Pliyev to use “all the power of the Soviet forces”
to repel an invasion, except nuclear weapons.64
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RAPID CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE SITES
During September the Soviets began construction
of offensive missile sites. From September 1-5, 1962,
construction secretly began on SS-5 IRBM sites in
Guanajay. In the following 5 days, a Soviet armored
group arrived at Remedios. Then from September 1520, construction began at San Cristobal on the SS-4
MRBM sites. Construction also began at the Remedios
IRBM site. Another Soviet armored group also arrived
at Holguin during this same time period.
From September 20-25, 1962, construction began
on SAM sites at Los Angeles, Chaparra, and Jiguani.
In the next 5 days, construction began at the Sagua La
Grande MRBM sites. Construction also began on SAM
sites at Manati, Senado, and Manzanillo.65
THE DCI HONEYMOON CABLES
On September 6, 1962, McCone met with McGeorge
Bundy and Roswell Gilpatric in Paris to warn them
that he believed the Soviets would place offensive
missiles in Cuba. In a series of cables between McCone
in France and acting DCI Lieutenant General Marshall
S. Carter in Washington (which became known as the
honeymoon cables), McCone continued to warn about
the possibility that the Soviets would place offensive
missiles in Cuba.
In a cable dated September 7, 1962, McCone urged
“frequent repeat missions of recent reconnaissance
operations which [Deputy Secretary of Defense
Roswell] Gilpatric advises informative. Also I support
use of R-101 if necessary.” McCone also suggested that
the Board of National Estimates study the motives
“behind these defensive measures which even seem
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to exceed those provided most satellites.” Three days
later, McCone cabled “difficult for me to rationalize
extensive costly defenses being established in Cuba. . . .
appears to me quite possible measures now being taken
are for purpose of insuring secrecy of some offensive
capability such as MRBMs to be installed by Soviets
after present phase completed and country secured
from overflights.”66
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND “THE PHOTO
GAP”
Before leaving for his wedding and honeymoon,
McCone said that he “left orders to overfly Cuba every
day and the ship had hardly left the dock when my
order was canceled by Rusk and McNamara, especially
Rusk who feared a U.S. plane with a civilian pilot
would be shot down and create a hell of a mess.”67
But according to Sam Halpern, the DCI did not, in
fact, have the authority to order U-2 flights. The CIA
had to get approval of the Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance (COMOR) for U-2 overflights. But
McCone’s continued urging of overhead flights was
conveyed to senior administration officials by the
Deputy DCI (DDCI).
Later, in its post crisis review of intelligence, the
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
(PFIAB) noted that in September 1962 inclement
weather delayed some of the scheduled U-2 missions.
It also noted that from “September 8 to September 16,
U-2 missions over Cuba were suspended apparently
because of the loss of a Chinese Nationalist U-2 over
the China mainland on September 8.”
The PFIAB report noted that the next successful U-2
mission was not flown until September 26, 1962. No low
level flights were flown over Cuba until October 23.
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The PFIAB concluded that “although we were unable
to establish the existence of a policy which prevented
overflying areas of Cuba where surface-to-air missile
installations were present, the Central Intelligence
Agency and others believed that such a restriction did
in fact prevail.”68
OPPOSITION TO U-2 FLIGHTS
In his book, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the
Cuban Missile Crisis, Dino Brugioni clearly describes
the continued opposition of Rusk and Bundy to any
overflights in the wake of the shoot down of the Chinese
Nationalist U-2 over China. One can understand how
the CIA and others thought there was a policy against
such flights over Cuba when proposals for such
overflights were continually opposed by these two
senior-level foreign policy officials.
In the wake of this shoot down, a Special Group
meeting was scheduled on September 10 in the Bundy’s
office to discuss aerial reconnaissance over Cuba. At
that meeting, both Rusk and Bundy questioned the
need to overfly Cuba. Rusk was concerned that a U-2
being shot down over Cuba would generate a crisis
similar to the Francis Gary Powers shoot down over
the Soviet Union in May 1960. Rusk, supported by
Bundy, said that the Kennedy administration faced
a number of problems concerning the continued use
of the U-2. The United Nations (UN) had convened in
September, and congressional elections were coming
up in November 1962. The downing of a U-2 could
have dramatic repercussions. Couldn’t intelligence
objectives be met by peripheral reconnaissance flights
using oblique photography? The reconnaissance
experts at this meeting tried to point out to Rusk that
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slant photography to avoid SAMs would produce poor
results.69
It is important to note that Brugioni was one of
the original 12 who, under the direction of Arthur
C. Lundahl, organized the NPIC. During the missile
crisis, Brugioni was the chief of a unit responsible for
providing all-source collateral information to photo
interpreters. Every morning, Lundahl would review
the all-source intelligence before taking it to the USIB
and the Executive Committee (EXCOM) of the NSC.
Returning from these briefings, Lundahl would inform
his staff chiefs, who included Brugioni, of the recipients’
reactions and their continuing intelligence needs.
Lundahl was an astute observer, and Brugioni made
detailed notes of what Lundahl had seen and heard so
that the NPIC might better respond to the concerns and
needs of policymakers. The CIA photo-exploitation
shop was founded in the early 1950s and had invited
other organizations to join. Two days before President
Eisenhower left office in January 1961, it was renamed
the NPIC. This NPIC continued as a joint CIA-military
organization until the late 1990s.70
Brugioni noted that during the September 10
meeting, Attorney General Robert Kennedy became
impatient with Rusk, stating at one point, “Let’s sustain
the overflights and the hell with the international
issues.” Robert Kennedy supported a CIA proposal,
which had McCone’s strong support, to conduct a
single high level U-2 flight to cover the Banes cruise
missile area as well as the areas not covered during the
August 29 and September 5 missions. Rusk was still
concerned about so much time over Cuban territory.
He thought the mission would be too exposed. Finally,
Kennedy looked at Rusk and said, “What’s the matter,
Dean, you chicken?”71
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The next day, Rusk, still fearful of a U-2 loss, even
asked the State Department Legal Officer to investigate
the possibility of having U-2 flights conducted under
the auspices of the Organization of American States
(OAS). He made a similar request to the Department
of Defense (DoD). Given the need to provide at least
6 months training to OAS pilots, it was doubtful that
U-2 overflights would ever be resumed if pilots had
to be non-Americans. The DoD General Counsel then
responded to Rusk on September 12 that the transfer
of U-2 flights would not be legally permissible either
under the UN or OAS charters.72
A compromise was reached. Four short flights
would be substituted for one long overflight. It was
not clear what sort of missions these were to be. On
September 17, a U-2 peripheral mission was authorized
by the President. By the time the U-2 reached the
Cuban coast, the weather forced the abortion of the
mission. Under the new rules for peripheral flights,
all reconnaissance aircraft were to fly no closer than
25 miles from the Cuban shore, the slant range of the
SA-2 SAMs. Peripheral flights by aircraft other than
the U-2 produced photography that was not usable.
The first successful U-2 peripheral flight was flown
on September 26, 1962. Its targets were areas that had
been covered before. The second successful peripheral
U-2 mission was flown on September 29 and covered
the Isle of Pines and the Bay of Pigs area. A new SA-2
and a cruise missile site were discovered. Two other
peripheral U-2 flights were flown on October 5 and
7, 1962. Their photography revealed more SA-2 SAM
sites, but no offensive strategic missiles.73
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THE FAILED ESTIMATE
On September 13, 1962, President Kennedy
again issued a public warning to the Soviets against
placing offensive missiles in Cuba.74 After issuing
two warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13,
President Kennedy called for a SNIE. On September
19, this SNIE was approved by the USIB and sent to the
President. It concluded the following:
[T]he USSR could derive considerable military
advantage from the establishment of Soviet medium
and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or
from the establishment of a submarine base there. As
between the two, the establishment of a submarine base
would be the more likely. Either development, however,
would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and
with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would
indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of
risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed
thus far, and consequently would have important policy
implications with respect to other areas and other
problems in East-West relations.75

Just prior to forwarding this estimate to the USIB for
final approval and dissemination to the President,
Sherman Kent called a meeting of his entire staff and
all members of the Board of National Estimates. At this
meeting, Kent summarized the situation as follows: The
DCI thinks the Soviets are placing offensive missiles in
Cuba. He doesn’t have any information we don’t have,
but he is convinced that the Soviets will or are doing
so. The estimate at hand says that we think they aren’t
and that they won’t. (The estimate had already been
worked over by the rest of the American IC, including
the U.S. military.) There is no hard evidence that
they will. Most importantly there was no overhead
photography proving that they are.
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Kent asked everyone in the room to express his or
her opinion on this subject. He went around the room
calling everyone by name. No one was left out, not
even the junior Cuban analyst.76 Kent wanted to know
who supported the DCI’s view, who did not, and why.
The author supported the view of one of the Board
Members who thought that the Soviets were certainly
willing and able to place offensive missiles in Cuba, but
would take a “salami slice” approach before doing so.
According to this view, the Soviets would first place a
submarine base in Cuba. Then, depending on the U.S.
reaction, they would move to place offensive missiles
in Cuba. The author recalls that no one at the meeting
took or supported the DCI’s position. The consensus
was that there was not enough convincing information
or evidence to support the DCI’s view. As Sherman
Kent put it with characteristic exasperation and flair,
“We can’t just tell the President that we think the
Soviets will put missiles in Cuba because Khrushchev
is a son-of-a-bitch. The President knows he’s a son of a
bitch.” He added that as an intelligence organization,
we are supposed to have the necessary evidence. And
we didn’t.77
With the stakes so high, great emphasis was placed
on aerial reconnaissance. A few recent reports from
human sources had indicated that offensive missiles
were being placed in Cuba, but the reports were not
enough in quantity or detail to overcome doubts
which arose in the absence of photographic proof. In
retrospect, the author wonders how many staff and
Board Members were unaware, as was he, that there had
been no successful U-2 flights over or even around the
periphery of Cuba from September 5 until September
26. The author does not recall this fact being mentioned
at all during that critical all-hands meeting of the staff
and Board Members just prior to the release of the
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estimate on September 19. Brugioni had personally
informed Kent that there had been no U-2 coverage
of Cuba’s interior since the September 5 mission. But
Kent immediately interrupted and said “that’s another
ball game that we are not to get involved in.” He was
probably thinking about Rusk and Bundy’s continuing
opposition to overhead coverage of the interior.78
SHERMAN KENT REFLECTS
In an essay entitled “A Crucial Estimate Relived”
written in 1964 and declassified and published in
1994 by the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Kent
recounts the lack of human source reporting that had
been received by the time the SNIE was published
on September 19, 1961. This is true. Several excellent
reports were acquired during the first week of
September, but not received by clandestine means or
acquired by debriefings until after September 19. Kent
also pointed out that “nor did the aerial photography
of September dissipate the uncertainty. Not only
did it fail to spot the ominous indicators of missile
emplacement, but over and over again it made fools of
ground observers by proving their reports inaccurate
or wrong.”79
But there were no U-2 flights over western and
central Cuba from September 5 until early October.
There were no flights of any kind, even peripheral,
from September 5 until September 26. There was,
therefore, no way aerial photography could have
played a role in proving or disproving human source
reporting during that critical time prior the SNIE being
disseminated on September 19. It would appear that
notwithstanding Brugioni’s briefing, Kent simply did
not know the full extent of the lack of reconnaissance
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flights. The author recalls that among the ONE staff,
there was the assumption, even mind-set, that the lack
of reconnaissance intelligence meant that the U-2 had
flown but not found any missile sites. But the lesson is
that a lack of intelligence is not intelligence. It is just
that—a lack of information.80
Kent had reviewed the five reports which in
hindsight indicated that the Soviets might be placing
offensive missiles in Cuba. Sidney Graybeal, the CIA
offensive missile expert, reviewed these same reports
and concluded that there were errors in them. Graybeal
affirmed that all of the reported information and sites
had been checked against aerial photography. Kent
was satisfied and reviewed the estimate for a final time.
But there simply was no aerial photography against
which these reports could be checked. There were no
flights over the interior of Cuba from September 5 until
October 14—a total of 39 days.
The peripheral flight scheduled for September 17
was cancelled due to bad weather. The peripheral flights
that were made on September 26 and 29 and October
5 and 7 revealed more SAM sites but no offensive
missiles. There were, therefore, no flights of any kind,
peripheral or over the interior, from September 5 until
September 26—7 days after the estimate was released.
It would appear that Graybeal, like Kent, may not
have fully understood this absence of reconnaissance
photography.81
In addition to an understandable overemphasis
on technical collection, there was also an overreliance
on the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. policy in
convincing Khrushchev not to place offensive missiles
in Cuba. Those of us in ONE knew how determined
the President and his administration were to prevent
the Soviets from placing offensive missiles in Cuba.
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We got a feel for the heat of that policy determination
from senior CIA officials who dealt with the White
House and from the strength of the President’s public
warnings. Underlying our deliberations, therefore, was
our own mind-set that surely Khrushchev must have
understood the strength of the President’s policy resolve
the way we did. He did not. There were miscalculations
on both sides. By September 19, however,it is doubtful
that Khrushchev could have convinced the Presidium
that it was necessary to reverse the gears of Operation
ANADYR based solely on President Kennedy’s public
warnings.82
According to John T. Hughes, Special Assistant
to DIA Director Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll
during the missile crisis, strategic warning is the most
important element of effective intelligence. But perhaps
the greatest barrier to developing strategic warning
for policymakers is “the tendency of the human mind
to assume that the status quo will continue.” Hughes
said that several crises and conflicts after World War
II, including the Cuban Missile Crisis, confirm that
“nations do not credit their potential opponents with
the will to take unexpected acts. We did not believe the
Soviets would do so in 1962.”83
MCCONE FORCES APPROVAL OF
OVERFLIGHTS
When McCone returned to Washington from his
honeymoon in late September, he asked for a map
showing the actual U-2 coverage of Cuba since the
September 5 mission. That map showed that outside
of coastal areas, very little information about Cuba’s
interior had been obtained. According to Lundahl who
was present at that meeting, “McCone nearly came out
of his chair when he saw the map.” McCone then called
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for a special meeting of the Special Group for October
3, at which he took Secretaries Rusk and McNamara
to task. He was very concerned with statements being
made by spokesmen from the Departments of State and
Defense to the effect that there were no offensive missiles
in Cuba. McCone pointed out that there had been no
aerial reconnaissance over central or western Cuba for
over a month, and that all flights since September 5
had been of limited penetration or peripheral. McCone
said that as the President’s leader of the American IC,
he could make no definitive statement that there were
no offensive missiles in Cuba. He then said he would
so inform the President.84
Rusk still objected to the overflights because
a U-2 shot down over Cuba would be difficult
for the administration to explain. Bundy also still
insisted that the United States should try to achieve
its reconnaissance objectives by flying peripheral
missions. McCone then provided information clearly
showing that peripheral missions could not confirm
or deny the presence of offensive missiles. McCone
said he would seek permission for a number of short
flights over Cuba to cover the entire island based on
targets with intelligence priorities. These plans would
be presented to the Special Group on October 9.85
At this meeting, the COMOR Committee agreed
to conduct U-2 overflights from south to north. The
highest priority was the western portion of the island,
especially over the trapezoidal area reported in secret
writing by an espionage agent as being located near
San Cristobal in Pinar Del Rio Province. This area
was heavily guarded by Soviets where “very secret
and important work is in progress, believed to be
concerned with missiles.” That same day the Special
Group approved the COMOR recommendation
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for four U-2 south-to-north overflights that would
cover most of Cuba. The group also recommended
transferring reconnaissance responsibilities for Cuba to
the Strategic Air Command (SAC). The SA-2 sites were
by then mostly operational, and further overflights
had to be considered dangerous. McCone agreed. The
President approved the four overflights, and the stage
was finally set for the fateful October 14 U-2 mission
#3101. This was the flight over western Cuba that first
discovered Soviet SS-4 MRBMs being installed.86
The insistence of the DCI on overflights as opposed
to continued peripheral flights was a critical factor
in obtaining the President’s approval for the October
14 flight. McCone was correct in his assessment that
the SA-2 sites had been established “to blind our
reconnaissance eye.” But ironically the SA-2 had
been effective in a way that possibly even McCone
had not anticipated. Their discovery combined with
the fear caused by the shoot-down of the Chinese
Nationalist U-2, led Rusk and Bundy to undertake
self-induced blindness by opposing flights over the
interior. It was blindness achieved without firing a
shot. McCone deserves the major credit for pushing
the administration out of what was a politically “safe”
mind-set of peripheral flights and into overdue U-2
coverage of the interior of Cuba. (The lesson here is
that potential risks and dangers to national security
often require dangerous and high-risk intelligence
collection operations. A policy mind-set that avoids
such intelligence collection when the stakes are as high
as they were in Cuba can produce even greater threats
to our national security.)87
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THE DECEPTION CONTINUES
On October 6, 1962, Bolshakov told Robert Kennedy
that he had met with Khrushchev and Mikoyan during
a vacation on the Black Sea in mid-September 1962, and
that Khrushchev told Bolshakov to assure President
Kennedy that “no missile capable of reaching the
United States will be placed in Cuba.” Mikoyan added
that only SAMs were being installed in Cuba.
The following day, American journalist Charles
Bartlett invited Bolshakov to lunch to ask for his
message in writing on behalf of President Kennedy.
This message was repeated and passed to Kennedy
again. Theodore Sorensen later recalled that “President
Kennedy had come to rely on the Bolshakov channel for
direct private information from Khrushchev, and he felt
personally deceived. He was personally deceived.”88
INTELLIGENCE NOT DISSEMINATED
On October 11, 1962, McCone showed President
Kennedy photographs of crates loaded on the deck
of a ship which arrived in Havana in early October.
These crates were presumably carrying IL-28 Soviet
medium range bombers. President Kennedy requested
that such information be withheld until after the U.S.
elections. McCone replied that this was not possible.
This information had been disseminated to the IC and
several military commands. President Kennedy then
asked that the report state the probability that the
crates contained the bombers because no bomber had
yet been seen. McCone agreed.
The President then asked that all future information
be suppressed to which McCone replied that this would
be dangerous. It was agreed that such information
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would be disseminated to members of the USIB with
instructions that only those responsible for giving the
President advice be given the information. A minimum
number of experts within the CIA would also be
informed.89
In its post-crisis report, the PFIAB stated that the DCI
instructed the CIA analysts in May 1962 to check any
report with NPIC that was susceptible to photographic
verification. Although the purpose of this instruction
was to establish by all available means the authenticity
of refugee and agent reports, it was interpreted by
the CIA analysts as a restriction against publishing
anything, including espionage and refugee debriefing
information, that could not be verified by the NPIC
from aerial reconnaissance. Although this analytical
mind-set was formed by an incorrect interpretation
of the DCI’s instructions, it did result in delaying the
dissemination of human source information pending
the receipt of U-2 photography.
The President also contributed to the delay in
disseminating intelligence concerning possible Soviet
missiles by instituting the tightest possible control of
all information concerning offensive weapons in Cuba.
He wanted such information collected, analyzed, and
reported to officials with a real need to know. The USIB
interpreted this Presidential instruction as an injunction
against printing any information on offensive weapons
in Cuba in any intelligence publication.90
MISSILES DISCOVERED
On Sunday, October 14, 1962, a U-2 took the first
photos of a SS-4 MRBM site at San Cristobal, Cuba.
The U-2 photos, plus copies of the top secret Soviet
manuals for the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles clandestinely
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photographed by Penkovsky during 1961 in Moscow,
would enable the Guided Missile and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) and the Joint Atomic
Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) to determine
the stage of construction of each missile site on a daily
basis. The IC could tell Kennedy when each site would
become operational.91
The author remembers receiving and disseminating
within ONE, three very specific reports that have since
been declassified and which led to the fateful U-2 flight
on October 14. One was a report from an espionage
agent in Cuba who reported a conversation with the
personal pilot of Fidel Castro. The pilot confided on
September 9, 1962, that “we have 40-mile range guided
missiles, both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air,
and we have a radar system which covers, sector by
sector, all of the Cuban air space and (beyond) as far
as Florida. There are also many mobile ramps for
intermediate range rockets. They don’t know what is
awaiting them.” But this report was not disseminated
to the IC until September 20, the day after the Special
National Intelligence Estimate was disseminated. This
delay was most likely due to the time required for the
agent to securely transmit the information to the CIA
case officers.92
The author recalls quickly passing this report to the
ONE staff and board. The source was directly quoting
Castro’s pilot, who would have been in a position to
have acquired the information from traveling with
and being in the presence of Castro, and overhearing
privileged conversations. It was this access to Castro,
and the source’s directly quoting the pilot, that gave
this intelligence report particular significance. This
report was enough to convince the author that the
Soviets were placing offensive missiles in Cuba.
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Another report contained information from a
refugee debriefing. The refugee saw 20 trucks with long
trailers driven by Soviets during the night of September
12, 1962, in the Mariano district of Havana. The refugee
described a long object under wood and canvas
extending beyond the end of the trailers. The source
described the fins of the object and even drew a picture
of the missile silhouette and tail fin silhouette. Then
using photographs, he identified the object as a Soviet
SS-4 SHYSTER MRBM missile. But this report was not
disseminated until September 27, eight days after the
SNIE was disseminated. The author distinctly recalls
that this report was highly convincing, particularly
since the refugee drew an accurate picture of the
SS-4 missile, including its tail fin! He then identified
the missile from photographs. This was an excellent
detailed debriefing that contained information which
appeared to be accurate.93
Another important agent report was distributed
on September 18, 1962, the day before the SNIE was
disseminated. It reported that as of September 7, there
was a large restricted military zone in Pinar del Rio
Province. The report provided the coordinates of the
four cities that bounded this restricted area. These cities
were San Cristobal, San Diego de los Banos, Consolacion
del Norte, and Las Pozas. The report also described
strict security to prevent access to the finca (farm) of a
Dr. Corina, where “very secret and important work is
in progress, believed to be concerned with missiles.”
The coordinates were also given for the location of
this finca. A refugee also separately reported seeing a
convoy of Soviet flat-bed trailers carrying large tubes
extending over the end of the trailers, heading toward
Pinar del Rio province on September 17. This report
was distributed on October 1.94
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The above agent report, which contained the
coordinates in Pinar del Rio Province, was never
adequately credited for helping find the missiles. On
September 15, the agent conveyed the information
in secret writing in a letter mailed from Cuba via
international mail to an accommodation address in
a foreign city. It was the trapezoid formed by these
four cities that became the photographic target of the
U-2 flight on October 14 that first photographed the
Soviet SS-4 missiles. Prior to that date, the area of Cuba
described by the agent had not been photographed by
a U-2 flight since August 29. As previously mentioned,
operational control of the U-2 flights over Cuba was
officially transferred from the CIA to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff/SAC on October 12, 1962. On October 13,
the CIA U-2 detachment at Edwards Air Force Base
was transferred to McCoy Air Force Base in Orlando,
Florida, which would become the U-2 operating
base.95
Former DCI Richard Helms, in his memoir, A Look
Over My Shoulder,” stated that it was the agent report
concerning the large restricted zone in Pinar del Rio
province that convinced the White House to request
a U-2 flight over the San Cristobal area. It was 4 days
before the weather cooperated, but just before midnight
on October 13, a U-2 piloted by U.S. Air Force Major
Richard S. Heyser took off from Edwards Air Force
base in California and headed for San Cristobal, Cuba.
This flight first photographed the construction of
MRBM sites near San Cristobal. Major Heyser landed
at McCoy Air Base in Orlando, Florida. He described
it as a “milk run,” but it might also be counted as one
of the most significant reconnaissance missions in
history.96
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The film of this mission (an entire roll was 5,000 feet
long) was then rushed to waiting aircraft for transfer
to the Naval Photographic Intelligence Center in
Suitland, Maryland. The photo-analysts identified an
SS-4 MRBM launching site, and two SS-5 intermediate
range missile sites under construction. The latter
weapons had a range of over 2,000 miles and could
reach many major U.S. cities, much of eastern Canada
and northern South America. After the crisis, Ray Cline
asked both Robert Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy if
they would assess “how much that single evaluated
piece of photographic evidence [the San Cristobal SS-4
sites] was worth. . . . [T]hey each said it fully justified
all that the CIA had cost the country in all its preceding
years.”97
Much has been written about the above Cuban
agent report. One author, Max Holland, refers to the
report as coming from “a Cuban observer agent, the
lowest rank in the intelligence pecking order, who had
been recruited under MONGOOSE.” But in the world
of espionage, the value of an agent’s information is
determined by his or her access to priority intelligence
and the agent’s history of reporting reliability, not
necessarily the agent’s rank in a government hierarchy.
If the priority collection requirement is order of battle
information, as it was in Cuba during the Soviet military
build-up, then a reliable observer on the ground who
has visual access to important military activity can
be just as important as overhead photography or a
senior espionage agent inside the Cuban or Soviet
Government. This “observer agent” was actually
even more important than our Soviet espionage agent
Penkovsky, who by then had come under suspicion by
the Soviets and had lost his access.98
The above human source reports, two from espionage agents and one from a refugee, were not received
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in time to have any effect on the SNIE of September 19.
But after that date, intelligence analysts and especially
the ONE should have considered what to do with
this new information which seemed to contradict the
finding of the SNIE. In retrospect, it would seem that
perhaps ONE should have issued a brief statement
summarizing this new information and the reliability
of the three sources, thus alerting the White House and
the IC to the possibility that the estimate was wrong.
We did not issue such a statement.
If anything, the tendency in ONE generally was
to react to new human source intelligence by simply
waiting and assuming that U-2 aerial reconnaissance
would follow-up and prove or disprove it. But
unknown to the author, and presumably other ONE
and the CIA analysts, domestic political concerns
of the administration would prevent meaningful
overflight coverage of Cuba until the DCI returned
from his honeymoon and insisted that such coverage
be reinstated. This would, therefore, turn out to be
an example of a political mind-set which prevented
overhead U-2 reconnaissance, while a separate mindset simultaneously required such technical intelligence
before believing and disseminating important human
source intelligence. The perennial challenge for
intelligence analysts and policymakers will remain
how to analyze and evaluate correctly espionage and
other human source intelligence in the absence of
technical confirmation. (In an era characterized by the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [WMD],
particularly nuclear weapons, our national security,
and indeed our very survival, may well depend on
whether we learn how better to handle this challenge
in the future.)99
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Crisis Management.
On the evening of Monday, October 15, 1962, Bundy
was briefed on the discovery of the missiles by Ray
Cline, the CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence. Bundy
decided not to brief the President until the following
morning. He thought that a hastily-called meeting that
same evening could give away the secret of the missile
discovery. In any event, nothing could be done until
the following morning. He thought that the best course
for the President was for him to get a good night’s sleep
after a strenuous campaign weekend.100
On Tuesday morning, October 16, 1962, President
Kennedy was briefed on the discovery. The
President established an EXCOM of the NSC, by
NSC Memorandum 195 (which he actually signed on
October 22, 1962). The EXCOM met secretly beginning
on October 16 to advise him on how to respond to the
crisis.101
The following were members of the EXCOM:
Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara,
Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, National
Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor, President’s Special
Counsel Theodore Sorensen, Under Secretary of State
George Ball, DCI John McCone, and Soviet specialist
from the State Department Llewellyn Thompson. In
addition, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, John
McCloy, Robert Lovett, and others were consulted.
The President tape recorded the meetings without
the participants’ knowledge, and transcripts are now
available.102
Others who participated in the EXCOM either
as experts or in place of their superiors were Latin
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America Assistant Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin,
Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Roswell Gilpatric, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs Paul H. Nitze, Deputy
Director of the CIA General Marshall Carter, Kenneth
O’Donnell, Adlai Stevenson, and U.S. Information
Agency Deputy Director Donald Wilson. Dean Rusk
recommended that Dean Acheson become a member
of the EXCOM because of his quick grasp of complex
issues. The President approved.103
Although a member of the EXCOM, Vice President
Johnson was not present for EXCOM meetings during
the first week of the crisis. He returned to Washington
from a campaign trip to Hawaii on October 21 and
was briefed that day by McCone and Lundahl on the
discovery of the missiles.104
According to General Taylor, after being briefed at
the October 16 White House meeting on the discovery
of the missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy “gave no
evidence of shock or trepidation resulting from the
threat to the nation implicit in the discovery of the
missile sites but rather a deep but controlled anger at
the duplicity of the Soviet officials who had tried to
deceive him.” According to Lundahl, the President
said he wanted the whole island covered, he didn’t care
how many missions it took. “I want the photography
interpreted and the findings from the readouts as soon
as possible.”105
At a follow-up meeting in Secretary McNamara’s
office, McNamara was told that the maximum number
of U-2 missions that could be flown daily with existing
assets would be six, flying from early morning to late
in the evening. It was decided that both SAC and
the CIA U-2 pilots would cover all of Cuba. The CIA
pilots would be used only in “extreme circumstances,”
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and they would be recommissioned into the Air Force
and given Air Force credentials. The U.S. Navy’s Light
Photographic Squadron No. 62 was selected to conduct
low-altitude reconnaissance over Cuba. Hurricane Ella
delayed additional flights over Cuba until October 17
when a total of six U-2 missions were flown, along with
a massive electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection
effort on the part of the military services and the
National Security Agency (NSA).106
On the morning of Wednesday, October 17, the
staff of ONE was informed about the missile discovery.
The impact was one of shock and anger. We had all
been worried and concerned about this possibility
given the espionage and refugee source reporting that
had been received. The lid was clamped down tight
on any further dissemination of this knowledge to
anyone outside of ONE. The EXCOM met three times
during the day to discuss what action the United States
should take. Different views and alternatives were
discussed but in the end, there was a firm agreement
that the missiles had to be removed from Cuba. The
author recalls no retreat from that unshakable policy
commitment throughout the crisis.107
Also on October 17, DCI McCone went to
Gettysburg to brief former President Eisenhower and
to get his views on what to do. Eisenhower leaned
toward military action which would cut off Havana
and therefore take over the heart of the government.
He thought this might be done by airborne divisions,
but was not familiar with the size of the Cuban forces
in the immediate area or their equipment.108
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SOVIET DECEPTION AND PRESIDENTIAL
WARNING
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko made a previously planned visit to the White House on Thursday,
October 18, accompanied by Soviet Ambassador
Dobrynin. Gromyko assured President Kennedy
that offensive missiles would not be placed in Cuba.
President Kennedy repeated his public warning and
again pointed out the serious consequences that would
arise if the Soviet Union placed missiles or offensive
weapons in Cuba. Gromyko assured him this would
never be done, and that the United States should not
be concerned. Kennedy displayed a remarkable calm
during the TV and photo coverage of that White House
visit, as he listened to the Soviets lie to him 2 days after
he received the U-2 photos of the MRBM site in western
Cuba.109
ESTIMATES LEAD TO POLICY DECISIONS
The President departed Washington on Friday,
October 19, for campaign appearances in Chicago.
That same day, a SNIE was written to evaluate the
probable Soviet reactions to certain U.S. courses of
action in Cuba. The SNIE concluded that “a major
Soviet objective of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba
was to demonstrate that the world balance of forces
has shifted so far in their favor that the U.S. can no
longer prevent the advance of Soviet offensive power
even into its own hemisphere.” It also concluded that,
if the U.S. takes direct military action against Cuba,
the Soviet Union would not attack the U.S., either from
Soviet bases or with its missiles in Cuba, even if the
latter were operational and not put out of action before
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they could be readied for firing. Since the USSR would
not dare to resort to general war and could not hope
to prevail locally, the Soviets would almost certainly
consider retaliatory actions outside Cuba. . . . We believe
that whatever course of retaliation the USSR elected, the
Soviet leaders would not deliberately initiate general
war or take military measures, which in their calculation,
would run the gravest risk of general war.110

Also on October 19, a joint evaluation of the Soviet
missile threat was prepared by GMAIC, JAEIC, and the
NPIC. This evaluation of the MRBM (NATO designation
SS-4) and the IRBM (NATO designation SS-5) missile
sites drew heavily on Penkovsky’s information. Based
on U-2 photography and this documentary information
from Penkovsky, one of the SS-4 regiments which has a
total of eight launchers and 16 missiles was considered
operational. Two SS-5 sites with a total of eight
launchers were under construction near Havana. One
site would be operational in six weeks, and the other
could be operational between December 15-30, 1962.
Although the evaluation stated that one nuclear
warhead storage facility was under construction near
the SS-5 sites, it also stated “there is no evidence of
currently operational nuclear storage facilities in Cuba.
Nevertheless, one must assume that nuclear weapons
could now be in Cuba to support the operational missile
capability as it becomes available.” The evaluation also
said that “There are several refugee reports indicating
the presence of tactical [FROG] missiles in Cuba,
although there is no photographic confirmation thus
far.” As noted earlier, FROG is the NATO designation
for the Soviet LUNA Tactical Missile. It is interesting
to note that only after U-2 photography confirmed the
presence of offensive missiles in Cuba, was reporting
on the Soviet military build-up from human sources
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such as espionage agents and refugees given serious
credibility.111
Another SNIE was written on Saturday, October 20,
to assess the major consequences of certain U.S. courses
of action with respect to Cuba. The estimate stated
that any naval blockade of Cuba would not place the
Soviets under immediate pressure to choose a military
response. Should the United States use force against
Cuba, the likelihood of a Soviet response by force,
either locally or elsewhere, would be greater than in the
case of blockade. This estimate repeated the conclusion
that the Soviets would not attack the United States in
response to military action against Cuba, even if the
Soviet missiles in Cuba were operational and not put
out of action. While acknowledging the possibility that
the Soviets might miscalculate, the estimate repeated
that the USSR would almost certainly not resort to
general war, but would consider retaliation outside of
Cuba. The estimate added that “a rapid occupation of
Cuba would be more likely to make the Soviets pause
in opening new theaters of conflict than limited action
or action which drags out.”
The estimate concluded that there were four
MRBM and two IRBM sites under various stages of
construction. The MRBM had a range of about 1,100
nm and the IRBM a range of about 2,200 nm. Sixteen
launchers for MRBMs must be considered operational
now. In addition, the inventory of other weapons then
included 22 IL-28 jet light bombers, one of which was
assembled and three others which were uncrated.
According to this estimate, the inventory also
included 39 MiG-21 jet fighters, of which 35 were
assembled and four still in crates; and 62 other jet
fighters of less advanced types. There were 24 SA-2
sites, of which 16 were believed to be individually
operational with some missiles on launchers. There
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were three cruise missile sites for coastal defense, of
which two were operational. The estimate also reported
12 Komar cruise missile patrol boats; all were probably
operational or nearly so.112
The IL-28 had a combat radius of about 750 miles.
There was considerable discussion within the staff and
the Board of National Estimates as to whether the IL28 should be considered an offensive weapon. These
bombers could strike parts of the southeastern United
States and were eventually included with the missiles
as offensive weapons which were removed from Cuba.
It is interesting that Secretary McNamara expressed
his opinion at an EXCOM meeting on October 17 that
if nuclear warheads were supplied to the MRBMs,
then the Soviets would also supply nuclear bombs for
bombers with offensive capability.113
THE PRESIDENT DECIDES TO BLOCKADE
After a telephone call from Robert Kennedy, the
President returned to Washington that Saturday from
a campaign trip to the mid-west feigning a cold. The
afternoon meeting began with an intelligence briefing
by McCone and Ray Cline, the Deputy Director of
Intelligence. Cline covered the points made in the
October 20 SNIE discussed previously. Secretary
McNamara specifically referred to this estimate and
its conclusion that the Soviets would not use force to
push their ships through a blockade. After additional
discussion, the President decided to implement a
naval blockade or quarantine as a first step. Air strikes
and invasion could follow if the quarantine was not
successful in forcing the Soviets to remove the missiles.
The President decided to delay the quarantine to permit
consultation with our allies.114
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During this critical meeting, General Taylor and
National Security Advisor Bundy wanted to start with
an air strike while everyone else wanted to start with a
blockade. Robert Kennedy argued that a surprise attack
could not be undertaken if the Unites States were to
maintain its moral position at home and around the
globe.
During the meeting, lines were clearly drawn
between the groups that would later be labeled
“doves” and “hawks.” Doves included McNamara,
Stevenson, Rusk, and apparently Sorensen, who were
against following up the blockade with an air strike.
They preferred negotiations with the Soviets over
U.S. missiles in Turkey, Italy, and the U.S. base in
Guantanamo, Cuba. The President sharply rejected the
thought of surrendering Guantanamo in the present
situation. Rusk wanted to delay a decision on the next
step until after a blockade, which he preferred to call a
“quarantine.” Joining Taylor and Bundy as hawks were
Robert Kennedy, Dillon, and McCone who wanted the
blockade to serve as an ultimatum to be followed by an
air strike.
This meeting was not tape recorded because it
was held in the Oval Room on the second floor of
the Executive Mansion and not in the West Wing of
the White House. Based on the notes of participants,
however, President Kennedy approved the blockade
as well as actions necessary to put the United States in
a position to undertake an air strike on the missiles and
missile sites by Monday or Tuesday. He also said that
he was prepared to authorize the military to take those
preparatory actions which they would have to take
in anticipation of the military invasion of Cuba. The
President stated flatly that the Soviet bombers in Cuba
did not concern him particularly. He said we must be
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prepared to live with the Soviet threat as represented
by these bombers. They did not affect the balance
of power, but the missiles already in Cuba were an
entirely different matter.
When General Taylor returned to the Pentagon
after the meeting, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “This
was not one of our better days.” He added that the
President had said, “I know you and your colleagues
are unhappy with the decision, but I trust that you
will support me in this decision.” Taylor said he had
assured the President they would. General Earle G.
Wheeler, Chief of Staff of the Army, remarked: “I never
thought I’d live to see the day when I would want to go
to war.”115
MILITARY STRIKE REVIEWED
At a meeting on Sunday, October 21, with President
Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Secretary
McNamara, General Taylor, and DCI McCone, the
plans were reviewed in considerable detail for an air
strike against the missile bases, the air fields, and a few
SAM sites in critical locations, as well as for an invasion.
General Taylor was instructed to plan for the necessary
air strike. There was complete agreement that military
action must include an invasion and occupation of
Cuba.
Secretary McNamara and General Taylor told the
President that an air strike could not provide absolute
assurance that all missiles would be destroyed. They
indicated a 90 percent probability. They also stated
that any warning would probably cause missiles
to be moved to unknown locations. General Taylor
therefore recommended that the air strike be conducted
immediately, suggesting the next morning, and without
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warning. Secretary McNamara confirmed the above
military appraisal but made no recommendation as to
policy.
In response to direct questioning from the President,
the attorney general and DCI McCone advised against
a surprise attack “for the reasons discussed at previous
meetings.” The attorney general did not make an
absolute recommendation about future military action,
indicating action could be decided as the situation
developed. Only preparatory steps should be taken
now. McCone urged the President to indicate publicly
the intention to remove the missiles and other weapons
by “means and at a time of his own choosing,” if
surveillance proved that the Soviets and Cubans were
not removing them.116
BRIEFING IKE, LBJ, AND ALLIES
On Sunday, October 21, 1962, the DCI briefed
Eisenhower a second time, at McCone’s residence.
Lundahl accompanied the DCI to explain the
photography. Eisenhower went along with the
“suggested plan of initiating a blockade, conducting
intense surveillance, and announcing the intention of
taking military action if the Soviets and the Cubans
either maintained the status quo of their missile
installations or continued the construction of their
missile bases. The military actions he [Eisenhower]
envisaged would be air strikes and invasion.”117
Also on that Sunday, at the request of the President,
McGeorge Bundy, the DCI, and Lundahl briefed Vice
President Johnson. Johnson “favored an unannounced
strike rather than the agreed plan which involved
blockade and strike and invasion later if conditions
warranted.” However, the Vice President agreed
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reluctantly to a blockade after learning of Eisenhower’s
support.118
Also on Sunday, teams traveled abroad to brief our
allies: Prime Minister John Diefenbaker in Canada,
Prime Minister Harold MacMillan in Britain, and
West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. All were
supportive. French President Charles de Gaulle was
briefed at mid-day on Monday, October 22, by Acheson
and Kent. Kent recalled that de Gaulle asked, “Are you
here to consult with or to inform me?” “I am here to
inform you,” replied Acheson. Despite this rather cool
beginning, Kent felt “delighted at the great interest
de Gaulle showed in these photographs. When told
that the photographs had been taken from a height
of 14 miles, de Gaulle exclaimed ‘C’est formidable!
C’est formidable!’” The general asked if Kennedy had
considered the possibility that the Russians might move
in Berlin. Acheson replied that it had been considered,
but should the Russians move, it would mean war. De
Gaulle assured Acheson that it would not come to war.
He then assured Acheson that Kennedy could count
on his support. “It’s exactly what I would have done,”
he added.119
Upon his return, Kent briefed the staff and the
Board of the ONE. At a packed meeting, Kent said
that he and Acheson had been prepared for a difficult
meeting with the French President. Kent recounted de
Gaulle’s question about being consulted or informed
and that de Gaulle was told quite frankly by Acheson
that he was being informed. But overall Kent said he
was pleasantly surprised at how well the briefing of
de Gaulle had gone. According to Kent, de Gaulle
was both satisfied and supportive of the intelligence
briefing and of President Kennedy’s decision.120
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On Monday October 22, 1962, the President briefed
leaders from Congress, and the American Embassy
in Moscow delivered a copy of Kennedy’s speech
to Khrushchev 1 hour before the President went on
national television.121
THE PRESIDENT’S ADDRESS AND DEFCON 3
President Kennedy made a television address to
the nation that Monday evening, October 22, 1962. This
was one of the best and most powerful crisis speeches
of the 20th century.
But this secret, swift, and extraordinary build-up of
communist missiles—in an area well known to have a
special and historical relationship to the United States
and the nations of the western hemisphere, in violation
of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and
hemispheric policy—this sudden, clandestine decision
to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of
Soviet soil—is a deliberately provocative and unjustified
change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by
this country if our courage and our commitments are
ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.122

The staff in ONE were relieved that the awful secret
they had been carrying around and guarding for the
previous 6 days was finally public knowledge. There
had been no leaks. We could now acknowledge and
discuss the crisis with other Agency officers. We could
acknowledge to spouses and families that the crisis
explained at least in part our recent grim countenances
and late working hours, although long tense days
were not all that unusual in ONE. After the President’s
speech had ended, we knew that we had successfully
kept the secret. We were now ready as a government
and as a people to unite in confronting this nuclear
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threat to the security and the existence of our nation
and potentially to all other nations of the free world.123
On that same day, the Pentagon placed the entire
U.S. military establishment on Defense Condition
(DEFCON) 3, an increased state of alert. This was the
greatest mobilization since World War II. SAC B-47
bombers were dispersed to over 30 civilian airfields
in the United States. At SAC bases in Spain, Morocco,
and England, B-47 bombers were loaded with nuclear
weapons. A massive airborne alert was begun by U.S.based B-52 bombers which were loaded with nuclear
weapons and by KC-135 tankers. Most communications
between headquarters and the B-52 bombers were
in the clear. The Soviets would intercept these
communications and would thus fully understand the
scope and seriousness of the growing U.S. military
response.124
The alert lasted for 30 days of continuous flight
operations—2,088 sorties in 48,532 continuous hours
of flying time, in which 20,022,000 miles were flown
without a fatality. Over 70 million gallons of fuel were
transferred in flight by the KC-135 tankers.125
Just as the Germans thought that General George
Patton was the best commander the Allies had in World
War II (and Patton agreed), so General Curtis Lemay
was perhaps the American leader most feared by the
Soviets during the Cuban Missile Crisis. General Lemay
was Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, whose command
responsibilities included the bombers of the Strategic
Air Command. He was perhaps the ultimate “cold
warrior,” and the Soviets knew it. In one of his talks to
SAC crews, he was quoted as saying, “There are only
two things in this world, SAC bases and SAC targets.”
Khrushchev knew that the SAC had targeted specific
Soviet cities for immediate destruction in the event of
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war and that “city busting” was being advocated by
General Lemay to bring the USSR quickly to its knees.
This Soviet fear of General Lemay, coupled with their
ability to listen to SAC communications which were
deliberately not enciphered, may well have been an
important factor in Khrushchev’s ultimate decision
to back down and withdraw offensive weapons from
Cuba. General Lemay may well have been one of the
most important and most under-rated players in the
missile crisis.126
Secretary McNamara received word in the evening
of October 22 that 91 Atlas and 41 Titan liquid-fueled
ICBMs were being readied for firing. The solid-fuel
Minuteman ICBM would enter the inventory during
the late days of the crisis. Polaris submarines took up
positions in the North Atlantic with enough nuclear
missiles to destroy all of Russia’s principal cities.
Matador and MACE tactical cruise missiles in West
Germany were brought to combat-alert status.127
Also on October 22, the Pentagon asked the
Association of American Railroads for 375 flatcars
immediately to move air-defense and air-warning
units to Florida. Later, the Pentagon would ask for
3,600 flatcars, 180 gondola cars, 40 boxcars, and 200
passenger coaches to move the over 15,000 men and
equipment of the 1st Armored Division from Texas to
Georgia. Some elements of the division would move
to southern Florida where they would bivouac at the
Gulf Stream Park Race Course at Hallandale, Florida.
Parking lots became motor pools. Some soldiers slept
in the grandstands; others picnicked or played touch
football in the infield. Although no racing program
was going on at Gulf Stream, troops enjoyed lining up
along the rails to watch the thoroughbreds work out
during the early morning hours.128
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The presence and activities of the troops from the
1st Armored Division at the race course were clearly
visible to the population in the area and to motorists
on the adjacent public highways and roads. This public
build-up of ground forces was one more method of
getting the message to the Soviets that the United
States was preparing not only to bomb, but also to
invade Cuba. This would add further credibility to the
stated U.S. policy of not allowing offensive missiles to
be established in Cuba.129
DEFCON 2
President Kennedy signed the order for the naval
quarantine on Tuesday, October 23, 1962. That same
day, Secretary of State Rusk obtained a unanimous
concurrence from the OAS to support the naval
quarantine of Cuba.130
Also on October 23, Soviet Defense Minister
Malinovsky, following an emergency meeting with
Khrushchev and the Soviet Council of Ministers, placed
the Soviet armed forces on a war footing. Marshal
Andrei Grechko, Commander of the Warsaw Treaty
Forces, increased the combat readiness of these forces.
But there were no threatening moves by the Soviet
army in Berlin or by the Soviet naval forces in the
Mediterranean. According to Sam Halpern, the Soviets
never called up their reserves, there were no conscript
classes called up, and there was no assembling of
aircraft, trains, or ships. In short, there was no Soviet
mobilization.131 Later on that Tuesday evening, NSA
flashed word to the CIA watch office that its directionfinding efforts indicated that Soviet ships bound for
Cuba that were suspected of carrying missiles, had not
only changed course, but were probably on their way
back to Russia.132
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The next day, Wednesday, October 24, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff issued DEFCON 2, a maximum alert
with the optimum posture to strike either Cuba or
the USSR or both. With DEFCON 2, a total of 1,436
bombers and 134 ICBMs were on constant alert. The
missiles were ready for launching and one-eighth of
the bombers were in the air at all times. The rest of the
air crews were waiting near their bombers, ready to
take off at a moment’s notice. That evening, a Pentagon
spokesman confirmed that “at least a dozen Soviet
vessels have turned back, presumably because, to the
best of our information, they might have been carrying
offensive materials.” Other vessels still proceeded
toward Cuba.133
Late that Wednesday evening, President Kennedy
called Secretary McNamara to confirm when our forces
would be ready to invade Cuba. McNamara replied, “In
7 days.” When the President pressed whether all the
forces would be well prepared, McNamara replied that
they would be “ready in every respect in 7 days.”134
Initial Reaction.
On Wednesday, October 24, Bartlett showed the
U-2 photos of missiles in Cuba to Bolshakov over
lunch at the National Press Club. Bolshakov denied
any knowledge of offensive missiles in Cuba.135
That same day, the official world reaction showed
a generally favorable response to the U.S. action,
particularly in Latin America. On Tuesday, October
23, the OAS representatives had approved a resolution
endorsing the naval quarantine without opposition.
One abstention was due to a lack of home government
instructions. There were no indications of any Soviet
aircraft movement to Cuba. Measures to achieve a
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higher degree of action readiness for Soviet and Bloc
forces were not being taken on a crash basis. But
existing MRBM and IRBM sites in Cuba were being
rapidly completed, as were buildings believed to
provide storage for nuclear warheads.136
Aerial photography of Cuba on October 24 and
25 clearly showed that work on the missile sites was
moving ahead rapidly, even faster than before. The
nuclear warhead storage building at San Cristobal site
No. 1 had been completely assembled in 2 days. Two
IL-28 Beagle bombers had been assembled, three more
were in the process, and crates for an additional 20
bombers were at San Julian airfield.137
DCI McCone reported that as of 6 o’clock Thursday
morning, October 25, at least 14 of the 22 Soviet ships
that were known to be en route to Cuba had turned
back. Those that turned back had a history of carrying
military cargo.138 On that same day, U.S. Ambassador
to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, displayed the U-2
photos to the UN Security Council, winning a major
public relations victory for the United States. Soviet
Ambassador Valerian Zorin replied only that, “We
shall not look at your photographs.”139
Official Soviet Reaction.
At 7 o’clock on Friday morning, October 26, the first
vessel was stopped and boarded under the quarantine.
It was the Marucla, an American-built liberty ship,
Panamanian-owned, registered from Lebanon, and
bound for Cuba under a Soviet charter from the
Baltic port of Riga. The vessel was found to contain
no weapons and was allowed to sail on. The Marucla
was carefully and personally chosen by President
Kennedy to be the first ship stopped and boarded. It
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demonstrated that the United States was indeed going
to enforce the quarantine. But because the ship was not
Soviet-owned, this action did not represent a direct
threat to the Soviets requiring a response. This gave the
Soviets more time, but simultaneously demonstrated
that the United States meant business.140
That same day, Aleksandr Semyonovich Feklisov
(alias “Fomin”), the KGB resident in Washington,
replaced Bolshakov as the conduit between Khrushchev
and Kennedy. He asked for a meeting with John Scali
of the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) and
asked if the United States would accept a deal whereby
the USSR withdraws all offensive missiles under UN
supervision and the United States agrees not to invade
Cuba. This would, in fact, be the primary basis for an
eventual agreement.141 Also on October 26, Khrushchev
sent a long emotional message to Kennedy with the
same offer as was conveyed by Feklisov to Scali. The
following day, Saturday, October 27, a Soviet SA-2
missile shot down a U-2 aircraft over Cuba, killing
the pilot, U.S. Air Force Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr.
The U-2 was shot down using Moscow’s order dated
October 22 authorizing Pliyev to use all defensive
means against the United States, except for nuclear
weapons. Pliyev’s deputy had authorized the downing
of the U-2 by SAMs.142
Khrushchev sent a second message on Saturday,
October 27, broadcast publicly on radio, adding the
condition that the United States withdraw Jupiter
missiles from Turkey. Based on the suggestion of
his brother Robert, and supported by Sorensen, the
President decided to ignore the second message and
accept the first. Robert Kennedy and Sorensen then
drafted the reply. It stated that if the Soviet missiles
and offensive weapons were removed from Cuba
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under UN inspection and verification, the United States
would agree with the rest of the Western Hemisphere
not to invade Cuba.143
THE DARKEST DAY
Saturday, October 27, 1962, was the darkest day of
the crisis. The Soviets continued the rapid construction
of missile sites and had shot down and killed U-2 pilot
Major Anderson. The State Department analyst assigned to ONE for Latin America informed the author
that the two of them had been assigned the responsibility
of drafting a new SNIE. The subject was the probable
reaction of governments in Central and South America
to U.S. air strikes followed by an invasion of Cuba.
The OAS had previously unanimously approved a
U.S. naval blockade of Cuba, but a bombardment and
invasion of Cuba was a different matter.
The earlier August 1, 1962, NIE on the situation and
prospects in Cuba stated that there was widespread
disillusionment in Latin America regarding the Cuban
Revolution. We did not think that any Latin American
government (other than Cuba) was truly comfortable
with the presence of Soviet strategic nuclear missiles
in the Western Hemisphere particularly because these
same missiles could reach much of Latin America, as
well as the United States. We thought that most Latin
American governments were relieved that President
Kennedy in his October 22 speech had placed the
entire hemisphere under the protective umbrella of
U.S. conventional and strategic forces. We, therefore,
concluded in our draft that should diplomacy and the
naval quarantine fail to force the Soviets to remove their
offensive missiles from Cuba, most Latin American
governments would support a U.S. bombardment and
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invasion of Cuba. A few would probably criticize such
military action publicly, but would most likely support
it privately.144
That we had been asked on such short notice to
draft this SNIE was another strong indicator that
the United States was indeed preparing to bomb
and invade Cuba. U-2 coverage continued to show
accelerated construction of the missiles sites in Cuba.
Some were becoming operational. This, plus the
shoot-down of Major Anderson, led the two of us to
speculate that military action would probably begin
on or about Tuesday, October 30. This speculation was
based on recent events and the policy firmness of the
White House that the missiles must be withdrawn. The
author was not aware of the October 24 conversation
between President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara
in which McNamara twice assured the President that
the U.S. military would be ready “in every respect”
to bomb and invade Cuba in 7 days, i.e., on October
31. This draft SNIE was never finished. The next day,
Sunday, October 28, Khrushchev announced publicly
that he would withdraw the missiles from Cuba.145
On Saturday, five of the six MRBM sites were
believed to have a full operational capability. The sixth
was estimated to become operational on Sunday, which
meant that the Soviets would then have the ability to
coordinate the launching of up to 24 MRBM missiles
within 6 to 8 hours of a decision to do so. There would
be a refire capability of up to 24 additional missiles
within 4 to 6 hours. At that point, 33 MRBM missiles
had actually been observed. No IRBM missiles had yet
been observed. The probable nuclear bunkers adjacent
to the MRBM sites were not yet ready for storage,
assembly, or checkout. Aerial photography from
October 25 confirmed the presence of a FROG missile
launcher in a vehicle park near Remedios.146
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THE FINAL WARNING
On Saturday evening, October 27, Robert
Kennedy met with Soviet Ambassador to the United
States Anatoly Dobrynin in Kennedy’s Justice
Department office. He delivered the President’s reply
to Khrushchev’s message from the previous day.
Kennedy told Dobrynin that the President must have
a commitment by the following day, October 28, that
the offensive missile bases would be removed. “I was
not giving them an ultimatum but a statement of fact.
He [Dobrynin] should understand that if they did not
remove those bases, we would remove them.”
Dobrynin raised the question of the Jupiter missiles
in Turkey. Kennedy said there could be no quid pro quo
under the current threat and that ultimately this was
a decision which would have to be made by NATO.
However, President Kennedy had wanted to remove
those missiles for some time, and it was his judgment
that they would be removed within a short time after
the current crisis was over. That same evening, the
President ordered 24 troop-carrier squadrons of the Air
Force Reserve to active duty. They would be necessary
to support an invasion.147
On Sunday, October 28, the CIA published a
memorandum, “The Crisis, USSR/Cuba,” prepared
for the EXCOM. “All 24 MRBM launchers now appear
to have reached full operational readiness. One nuclear
storage facility is essentially complete, but none of the
bunkers observed is yet believed to be in operation.”
No significant redeployment of major Soviet
ground, air, or naval forces had been noted. The
general posture of Soviet ground forces in forward
areas was one of precautionary defensive readiness.
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Khrushchev’s attempt to get reciprocal withdrawal of
offensive weapons from Cuba and Turkey appeared
to be the first step in Soviet efforts to negotiate a
solution. Soviet spokesmen continued to play down
the possibility that the Cuban crisis could lead to
general war. There was so far only fragmentary mixed
reaction to the President’s rejection of Khrushchev’s
Cuba-Turkey proposal.148
Khrushchev publicly agreed on Sunday, October
28, to remove the missiles in return for a U.S. pledge
not to invade Cuba. There was an implicit promise to
remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey later.149
AFTERMATH
The Special Group (5412 Augmented) called a halt to
the sabotage component of Operation MONGOOSE on
October 30. This Special Group was abolished. Covert
action against Cuba, however, did not end. At the end
of 1962, the EXCOM was renamed the Standing Group
and reduced in size to five members: McNamara,
McCone, Bundy, Sorensen, and Robert Kennedy.150
On November 2, 1962, two voiceless telephone calls
were made in Moscow to a telephone number given
by the CIA to Penkovsky for his use to indicate that
he had loaded a dead drop. The telephone pole had
the signal of a letter X in chalk indicating the drop had
been loaded. Richard Jacob, the U.S. Embassy archivist,
was sent to unload the drop. He was ambushed and
arrested by the KGB. The man in charge of his arrest
was Lieutenant General Oleg Gribanov, head of the
KGB Second Chief Directorate (responsible for internal
security and counterintelligence). Gribanov had also
supervised the earlier search and arrest of Penkovsky.
Jacob was declared persona non grata and departed
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the Soviet Union on November 6.151 Wynne was also
arrested in Budapest on November 2. The following
day, DCI McCone briefed President Kennedy on the
ambush of Jacob and Penkovsky’s probable arrest.152
On November 20, 1962, the Soviets decided on their
own to withdraw the IL-28 bombers, their six nuclear
bombs, and the tactical nuclear weapons. Castro was
unhappy: He had hoped to keep the tactical weapons
in Cuba.153
The CIA published a memorandum on November
29 concerning the deployment and withdrawal of Soviet
missiles and other weapons in Cuba. The Soviet claim
that they had actually delivered only 42 missiles to Cuba
and had now withdrawn them was consistent with
the CIA evidence. Available evidence also indicated
that the Soviets were preparing to withdraw the IL28 bombers, no more than 42 of which were delivered
before the quarantine began. The Soviets could easily
ship out all of these aircraft by mid-December 1962.
Other Soviet weapons systems in Cuba included
SAMs, coastal defense missiles, Komar missile boats,
and fighter aircraft. In addition, the equipment for
four armored combat groups (including possibly
6-10,000 men) remained on the island. The CIA had
no evidence of any preparations in Cuba to withdraw
these elements.154
Nuclear warheads were not actually seen in Cuba
until the post-crisis review of aerial photography taken
during the crisis period. Photo coverage from October
14 revealed a nuclear warhead processing facility at the
western end of the runway at the Mariel Naval Airfield.
On October 23, one of the warhead vans at the San
Cristobal MRBM launch site had its rails extended and
appeared to be transferring a warhead to a truck that
had parallel rails in its beds. The post-crisis review of
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photography also indicated that the Soviets had fueled
and mated the warheads and had practiced moving
the missiles to the erectors.
At a January 1989 conference of American and Soviet
leaders in Moscow, Soviet General Dmitri Volkogonov
said that during the crisis 20 nuclear warheads arrived
in Cuba and 20 more were aboard the Soviet merchant
ship Poltava, which turned back when the blockade
was announced. Sergei N. Khrushchev, son of Nikita
Khrushchev, said that the 20 nuclear warheads in Cuba
were never mated to the missiles but easily could have
been.155
MISSILES IN CAVES
There was a surge of intelligence reporting after
the crisis, mostly from refugees, that the Soviets
had secreted some of the offensive missiles in caves.
None of these reports was judged to be accurate.
On February 5, 1963, DCI McCone issued a formal
unclassified statement in the name of the USIB. In it, he
said, “We are convinced beyond reasonable doubt, as
has been stated by the Department of Defense, that all
offensive missiles and bombers known to be in Cuba
were withdrawn soon thereafter. . . . [R]econnaissance
has not detected the presence of offensive missiles
or bombers in Cuba since that time.” Concerning the
alleged storage of missiles in caves, McCone said, “All
statements alleging the presence of offensive weapons
are meticulously checked. So far, the findings have
been negative. Absolute assurance on these matters,
however, could only come from continuing penetrating
on-site inspections.” Such inspections, however, were
never agreed to or permitted by Castro.156
On February 6, 1963, Secretary McNamara
introduced an unclassified briefing in the State
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Department auditorium. He said, “In recent days
questions have been raised in the press and elsewhere
regarding the presence of offensive weapons systems
in Cuba. I believe beyond any reasonable doubt that
all such weapons systems have been removed from
the island and none have been reintroduced. It is our
purpose to show you this afternoon the evidence on
which we base that conclusion.” After this introduction,
John Hughes, the Special Assistant to the Director
of DIA, presented a detailed photographic review
of the introduction of Soviet military personnel and
equipment into Cuba, and of the removal of offensive
weapons systems.157
THE PRESIDENT’S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD
In its February 4, 1963, memorandum to the
President, the PFIAB stated:
In the course of our review, we sought to determine
whether there were lessons to be learned from an
objective appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses
of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort as disclosed by
the Cuba experience. We directed particular attention
to those areas of the intelligence process which are
concerned with such matters as (1) the acquisition of
intelligence, (2) the analysis of intelligence, and (3) the
production and dissemination of intelligence reports
and estimates in support of national policy formulation
and operational requirements.

The Board reviewed the performance of our
intelligence prior to the October 14, 1962, discovery of
offensive missiles. There was inadequate clandestine
agent coverage within Cuba, and full use was not
made of aerial photographic surveillance, particularly
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during September and October. Pointing to the failed
NIE from September 19, 1962, the Board concluded
that there was a malfunction of the analytic process
by which intelligence indicators are assessed and
reported. The manner in which intelligence indicators
were handled may well have been the most serious
flaw in our intelligence system which, if not corrected,
“could lead to the gravest consequences.”
Concerning espionage, the PFIAB concluded the
following: Clandestine agent coverage within Cuba was
inadequate. Although the limited agent assets of the
CIA and Army intelligence did produce some valuable
reports on developments in Cuba, we believe that the
absence of more effective clandestine agent coverage,
as an essential adjunct to other intelligence collection
operations, contributed substantially to the inability
of our government to recognize at an earlier date the
danger of the Soviet move in Cuba. It would appear that
over the years there has been a lack of foresight in the
long-term planning for the installation of these agents.

The PFIAB also concluded that:
full use was not made of aerial photographic surveillance,
particularly during September and October when the
influx of Soviet military personnel and armaments
had reached major proportions. We recognize that in
September inclement weather delayed some of the
scheduled U-2 missions. However, we note that from
September 8 to September 16, U-2 missions over Cuba
were suspended apparently because of the loss of a
Chinese nationalist U-2 over the China mainland on
September 8. We also note with concern that during
the period of increasing emergency, as pointed up by
intelligence indicators, there was not a corresponding
intensification of the scheduling of U-2 missions over
the island.
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The Board concluded that although they were
“unable to establish the existence of a policy which
prevented overflying areas of Cuba where surfaceto-air missile installations were present, the Central
Intelligence Agency and others believed that such a
restriction did in fact prevail.” As we now know, “full
use was not made of aerial photographic surveillance”
due to the opposition of Rusk and Bundy to flights over
the interior of the island. This opposition was based
on their concern about the political and diplomatic
repercussions if a U-2 had been shot down over Cuba.
The lack of “intensification of the scheduling of U-2
missions over the island” was due to this opposition
and not to a failure of the DCI or the CIA to seek
such intensification. In fact, we have seen how the
DCI consistently warned about the Soviets placing
offensive missiles in Cuba and continually pushed for
increased U-2 coverage over Cuba. The PFIAB report,
however, fails to note this and leaves the reader with the
impression that somehow the CIA and the American
IC were responsible for this “lack of intensification.”
Apparently the Special Group responsible for
authorizing U-2 flights was also not made fully aware
of the delay in the acquisition of aerial intelligence and
neither was most of the American IC. Delays were not
only due to weather, but also to the decision of senior
administration officials to fly only peripheral flights.
The Special Group should have been informed of the
delay in overflights and should have had a mechanism
to discover automatically such reporting omissions.158
On March 7, Bundy sent a copy of the PFIAB report
and the DCI’s February 28, 1963, memo response to the
President to President Kennedy’s secretary for filing.
He noted that, “These are explosive documents, and
their existence is not being widely discussed.” It is not
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clear what Bundy meant by “explosive documents,”
but he was certainly aware that it was his and Secretary
Rusk’s opposition that prevented U-2 flights over Cuba,
rather than a failure of the IC or the DCI. There is one
PFIAB document dated March 11, which indicated
McCone thought that unless the report was changed,
the top five people in the CIA, including the DCI,
would have to resign. We have no indication the report
was changed, and there were no resignations.159
But McCone’s February 28 memo has been
declassified. It is remarkably low key and noninflammatory. In his February 28, 1963, memorandum
to the President, McCone said that while he agreed
with some of the PFIAB’s findings, he thought
that his own study of the crisis reflected a “more
reasonable judgment” of the IC’s performance.
Concerning the failure to exercise urgency in conducting U-2 missions over Cuba, he demonstrated
sympathy and understanding for Rusk and Bundy’s
actions by stating one “must first carefully weigh
the serious considerations that enter into a decision
to overfly a denied territory.” Concerning the failed
September 19, 1962, SNIE, he noted that everyone
got it wrong, “including the State Department.”
Concerning espionage agent reports, none that had
significant information on offensive missiles reached
the IC or policymakers until after mid-September.
“When received they were used in directing aerial
photograpy.”
The Board also criticized the failed September 19
SNIE as due to:
A lack of adequate intelligence coverage of Cuba; the
rigor with which the view was held that the Soviet Union
would not assume the risks entailed in establishing
nuclear striking forces on Cuban soil; and the absence
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of an imaginative appraisal of the intelligence indicators
which, although limited in number, were contained
in reports disseminated by our intelligence agencies.
(We reach this conclusion even though we recognize
the absence at the time of any conclusive photographic
intelligence.)160

The PFIAB concluded:
We believe that the near-total intelligence surprise
experienced by the United States with respect to the
introduction and deployment of Soviet strategic missiles
in Cuba resulted in large part from a malfunction of the
analytic process by which intelligence indicators are
assessed and reported. This malfunction diminished
the effectiveness of policy advisers, national intelligence
estimators, and civilian and military officers having
command responsibilities. 161

The Board attached 35 examples of such indicators
as an annex to its report. “We urge that the annexed
illustrations be read not only for their individual content but also for the purpose of noting the cumulative
significance of the information being received. These
indicators were acquired from a variety of individual
sources, such as refugees, clandestine agents, and
friendly foreign diplomats.” As previously noted,
the Board concluded that the way these intelligence
indicators were handled may well be the most serious
flaw in our intelligence system, which, if not corrected,
“could lead to the gravest consequences.”162
As was previously noted, the Board discovered that
the CIA analysts had interpreted the DCI’s instruction
to check with NPIC on any report susceptible to
photographic verification as a restriction against
publishing anything that could not be verified by
NPIC. The President also imposed another limitation
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as discussed before. He made it clear that he wanted no
limitation on the collection and analysis of intelligence
relating to offensive weapons and all such information
was to be collected, analyzed, and promptly reported
to those officials who had a real need to know. He
wanted the tightest possible control of all information
concerning offensive weapons. The USIB, however,
interpreted the presidential instructions as an injunction not to print any information on offensive weapons
in Cuba in any intelligence publication. After this
injunction, even the President’s Intelligence Checklist
prepared by the CIA failed to include information from
any of the refugee or agent reports on the sightings of
offensive missiles in Cuba.163
The Board noted, however, that the photographic
evidence from the October 14 and subsequent
overflights was promptly processed and submitted
to the President in time for decisive action before
the Soviet MRBM and IRBM systems became fully
operational. In commending the high performance
achieved by “our foreign intelligence agencies during
the post-October 14 period, we recognize that it would
be difficult for the IC to operate with the same intensity
and efficiency under less critical conditions. Thus one
of our major problems remains the achievement of
very high performance between crises.”164
In commenting on lessons learned from the crisis,
Robert Kennedy wrote:
The time that was available to the President and his
advisers to work secretly, quietly, privately, developing a
course of action and recommendations for the President,
was essential. If our deliberations had been publicized, if
we had had to make a decision in 24 hours, I believe the
course that we ultimately would have taken would have
been quite different and filled with far greater risks.165
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McNamara has written:
The performance of the U.S. Government during that
critical period [of the Cuban missile crisis] was more
effective than at any other time during my 7 years’ service
as Secretary of Defense. The agencies of the government:
the State Department, the civilian and military leaders
of the Defense Department, the CIA, the White House
staff, the UN Mission, worked together smoothly and
harmoniously. 166

While McNamara gives Robert Kennedy much of
the credit for this performance, the President made
no statement attempting to take credit for himself
or for the administration. He instructed all members
of the EXCOM and government that, “no interview
should be given, no statement made, which would
claim any kind of victory. . . . [I]f it was a triumph, it
was a triumph for the next generation and not for any
particular government or people.”167
As previously mentioned, after the crisis the CIA’s
Deputy Director of Intelligence Cline asked Robert
Kennedy and Bundy how much they thought the
single evaluated U-2 photograph of the MRBM site on
October 14, 1962, was worth. They both replied, “It had
fully justified all that the CIA had cost the country in
its preceding years.” But without espionage and DCI
leadership, there would have been no photograph. The
prior cost of the CIA would not have been justified.
This U-2 photograph was the result of intelligence
from an espionage agent who described probable
MRBM sites in a trapezoidal area of western Cuba.
This combined with the unwavering insistence by the
DCI as the President’s leader of American Intelligence
that reconnaissance flights over the interior of Cuba
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be resumed, led President Kennedy to reverse the
previous opposition to such flights within his own
administration.
For a brief yet momentous time in our history, DCI
and Presidential leadership successfully combined to
produce accurate intelligence. Our national security
system worked and possible disaster was avoided. It
may not be possible in future crises to ensure the same
high quality of national security leadership. For its part,
however, the American IC can and must always strive
to improve the collection and analysis of all source
intelligence, particularly intelligence from espionage.
This will alway be one of the keys to successful national
security leadership.168
KHRUSHCHEV RESIGNS
On October 13, 1964, 2 years after the missile crisis,
Khrushchev resigned all of his party and government
offices. By 1964, Khrushchev had alienated a majority of
the Presidium. Although the main source of discontent
had been his continual reorganization of the party and
the state apparatus, the Cuban missile crisis played
a role in his downfall. It was resented as a Soviet
humiliation, not as a victory as Khrushchev had earlier
proclaimed.169
LESSONS LEARNED
A number of lessons can be learned from the
collection, analysis, and use of intelligence in the
Cuban Missile Crisis which have broad and continuing
applicability. First, we must realize the danger of
allowing a predetermined mind-set to blind intelligence
analysts and policymakers to evidence of the probable
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or ongoing actions of an adversary. Khrushchev’s
conviction that the West, in general, and the young
U.S. President, in particular, were weak and indecisive
led him to discount how far the U.S. leadership would
go to stop a new and dangerous threat to its security.
This mind-set was further bolstered by Khrushchev’s
ideological conviction that Communism was destined
to defeat capitalism. Conversely, the mind-set of U.S.
leaders led them to conclude that the Soviets would
certainly realize the seriousness of their actions, and
would believe and heed the seriousness of President
Kennedy’s warnings about the missiles.
The crisis also illustrated that almost all forms of
intelligence collection can have serious diplomatic
consequences if compromised. Had a U-2 been shot
down over Cuba without gaining clear evidence
of the Soviet missiles, it would have been a major
embarrassment to the United States, both internationally
and domestically. The President must take into account
the concerns of the State Department as well as the
Intelligence Community in deciding how much risk is
worth taking to gain the information needed to make
wise policy in dangerous situations. There is no silver
bullet formula for use in weighing the policy options in
such scenarios. But it is clear that the potential danger
to our national security of allowing Soviet missiles
with nuclear warheads to be established secretly in
Cuba warranted great diplomatic risks.
Another sometimes dangerous mind-set illustrated
by the crisis is the general tendency of intelligence
analysts and policymakers to give greater credence to
electronic and photographic intelligence than to human
source intelligence. This tendency has been exacerbated
by the need within the intelligence community to protect
the individuals and tradecraft involved in espionage,
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thus making intelligence leaders reluctant to release
beyond a very narrow circle information about the
source(s) of human intelligence. This, in turn, has made
it difficult for analysts and policymakers to weigh the
credibility of the information. Put simply, electronic
and photographic intelligence is comparatively “hard”
and thus comparatively easy to evaluate and use,
whereas human intelligence is more problematic.
Nonetheless, threats to our national security can often
only be fully and timely understood by conducting
espionage against our adversaries. Today information
collected by espionage and counterespionage
operations is shared more widely within the
intelligence community, particularly with the Director
of National Intelligence (DNI) and the DNI analytical
components. The objective is to help the DNI evaluate
more realistically the importance and accuracy of such
information.
We must increase our capability to conduct all
source intelligence collection operations against
governments and organizations that pose a risk to our
national security. This includes close cooperation with
allied intelligence services. Espionage has been, and
always will be, an important source of information for
our security. To support our future national defense, it
is essential that our government and our nation develop
a better understanding of the long-term necessity to
conduct espionage and other clandestine operations,
and that our analysts learn how to give appropriate
weight and credence to such intelligence. There will
never be enough information from espionage agents,
certainly not in the same quantity as intelligence
acquired from technical platforms. Analysts must look
at espionage as a vital but limited means of acquiring
critical intelligence. You cannot turn espionage off and
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on like you can with technical collection assets. We
should follow through on the commitment of outgoing
President George Bush to increase our capability for
HUMINT/Espionage by 50 percent.
The American operations officers who recruit
and run these clandestine operations do so often at
considerable risk to their own safety and the safety
of their families overseas. It is essential that we as a
nation develop a better appreciation for the integrity,
skill, dedication, and courage of the men and women
of America’s National Clandestine Service. It is for
this purpose and to these men and women that this
monograph is dedicated.
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ANNEX A
THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES1
The predecessor of the Office of National Estimates
(ONE) was the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE),
which was part of the new the CIA created by the
National Security Act of 1947. After the ORE failed
to foresee the North Korean invasion of South Korea
on June 25, 1950, President Truman chose Lieutenant
General Walter Bedell Smith to replace Admiral Roscoe
Hillenkoetter as the DCI. In November 1950, Smith
brought Harvard diplomatic historian William L.
Langer and Yale historian Sherman Kent into the CIA.
Both were veteran analysts of the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS), which was the U.S. clandestine foreign
intelligence and paramilitary service during World
War II. ORE was then replaced by the new ONE.
Henceforth, NIEs were to be produced by a Board
of National Estimates, which was a part of the ONE.
Langer became the head of the ONE and Chairman
of the Board of National Estimates, with Kent as his
deputy. After Langer returned to Harvard in 1952,
Kent took over both positions where he remained until
he retired on December 29, 1967, after more than 30
years of government service.
During the 1960s, the IC expanded in size and
capabilities. In 1961, the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) was created. In 1973, DCI William Colby
abolished ONE. He replaced it with a system of National
Intelligence Officers which exists today, known as the
National Intelligence Council.
1. Donald P. Steury, “Introduction,” Donald P. Steury, ed.,
Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates, Collected Essays
by Sherman Kent, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency,
Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994, pp. xi, xii, xxiv.
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ANNEX B
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
The U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) was created by
President Eisenhower by National Security Council
Intelligence Directive (NSCID) 1, issued in April
1958 and reissued in September that same year, to
account for the creation of the new USIB. Eisenhower
had a strong desire to force greater integration in the
American IC. This new NSCID 1 gave the DCI an
explicit formal mandate “to coordinate the foreign
intelligence effort of the United States, in accordance
with the principles established by statute and pertinent
National Security Council directives.” This was an
even stronger formulation than was contained in the
1947 National Security Act. Yet the DCI at the time,
Allen Dulles, continued to urge and persuade rather
than force management of the intelligence community.
Eisenhower backed off and accepted Dulles’ collegial
style of management rather than replace him.1
The USIB was initially comprised of 12 persons with
mixed backgrounds: academics, retired diplomats,
senior military officers, business executives, and
lawyers. Once an NIE had been drafted and reviewed
by the Board of National Estimates, it was submitted to
the USIB which was comprised of representatives from
all of the members of the Intelligence Community. The
USIB was chaired by the DCI in his role as the leader
of the Intelligence Community. Once an estimate
was approved by the USIB, the DCI then had the
responsibility to disseminate it to the White House and
to the National Security Council.2
In the opening sentence of the January 16, 1962,
memorandum from President Kennedy to the new
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DCI John McCone, the President said that “In carrying
out your newly assigned duties as Director of Central
Intelligence, it is my wish that . . . you undertake, as an
integral part of your responsibility, the coordination
and effective guidance of the total United States
Foreign Intelligence effort.” Unlike Dulles, McCone
enthusiastically welcomed his role as community
leader. He particularly wanted to enhance the nation’s
intelligence capabilities by applying modern science and
technology. The President’s memo instructed McCone
to work closely with the “heads of all departments
and agencies having responsibilities in the foreign
intelligence field.” This meant that the DCI outranked
the other intelligence chiefs, and was expected to deal
directly with their superiors. The President also said
that he expected the DCI would delegate much of
the task of running the CIA to the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence (DDCI), permitting him to focus on
his “primary task as Director of Central Intelligence.”3
Until January 1962, the DCI presided as Chairman
of the USIB and acted as the CIA representative on
the USIB. Based on the President’s memo, McCone
decided that he could be more impartial if he served
as Chairman of the USIB with the DDCI serving as the
CIA representative on the Board. McCone did this to
emphasize his role as a broad leader of the American
IC, not necessarily tied to the CIA positions. To
improve even further his ability to guide and manage
the intelligence community, McCone considered
separating himself entirely from the direct management
of the CIA. Although this would also have been in line
with President Kennedy’s memorandum, McCone was
not able to implement this additional step. Moreover,
during the missile crisis, McCone further decided
that he could not serve as chairman of the USIB
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while simultaneously functioning as a member of the
EXCOM. He asked DDCI General Carter to chair the
USIB during the crisis.4
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4. Ibid.; Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball To Eyeball—The Inside Story
Of The Cuban Missile Crisis, New York: Random House, 1991, p.
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ANNEX C
MAJOR INTELLIGENCE SOURCES USED
DURING THE CRISIS
Soviet Intelligence Sources.1
SIGINT - (GRU telephone intercepts in Washington).
KGB penetration of NSA and U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
“Sasha” - U.S. military intelligence officer recruited
by the KGB in Germany in 1959. He was stationed in
Washington during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962,
but could only supply low level intelligence during the
crisis.
U.S. Intelligence Sources.
Penkovsky - Soviet GRU officer who provided the
CIA and British MI-6 with voluminous intelligence
beginning in April 1961, but who lost his access to
senior Soviet military officers in July 1962 just when
we needed this access the most. Our last operational
contact with him was August 27, 1962, at a reception
in the apartment of the American Agricultural Attaché
in Moscow. Documents were clandestinely exchanged.
He was sighted again on September 5 at an American
embassy reception; and on September 6 at a British
film showing. His arrest was announced on December
12, 1962. Penkovsky was tried, and his execution was
announced in May 1963.2
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U-2 photos – After U-2 flights resumed over the interior
of Cuba on October 14, 1962, this photography in
“triangulation” with Corona photos of missile sites in
the USSR, and manuals for the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles
which were provided by Penkovsky’s espionage gave
the U.S. excellent intelligence coverage of the status of
missile site construction and readiness.
NSA SIGINT
CIA espionage agents in Cuba.
Cuban refugee debriefings - some 1,500 to 2,000 Cuban
refugees were debriefed every week in Miami.
Clandestine Operations.3
The Clandestine Service within the CIA conducts
espionage, counterespionage and covert action. It
was initially known as the Directorate of Plans. It was
subsequently renamed the Directorate of Operations.
It is now known as the National Clandestine Service
and is under the direction of the DCIA.
Espionage is still not understood by many persons in
government, journalism and academe. Espionage is the
clandestine collection of information about the plans,
intentions, and activities of foreign governments,
organizations, and persons, by human or technical
means. Human espionage involves the recruiting,
training and running in place of an agent who serves
and reports to us as a clandestine source. Espionage
conducted by technical means is not the collection of
intelligence by overt platforms such as aircraft and
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satellites. An example of espionage by technical means
would be the clandestine installation of an audio
device in a conference room used by senior officials of
a foreign government.
Counterespionage is the clandestine collection of
information by human or technical means about the
plans, intentions, and activities of foreign governments,
organizations, and persons to conduct espionage,
sabotage, assassination, and acts of terrorism.
Counterespionage operations may also be operations
designed to counter or protect against espionage,
sabotage, assassination, and terrorism—not just to
collect information.
Covert action is a third category of clandestine operations.
It is designed to influence foreign governments, events,
organizations, or persons in support of U.S. policy
objectives. Covert action operations are normally
conducted in a manner to conceal the identity of, or to
permit plausible denial by the sponsor. Such operations
may include political, economic, propaganda, or
paramilitary activities.
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